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WILL ROBOTS AGREE TO PAY TAXES? 
FURTHER TAX IMPLICATIONS OF ADVANCED AI 
 
Bret N. Bogenschneider, PhD, JD, LLM* 
An initial policy concern from rapid automation was that if robots 
continue to substitute for human workers, then a fiscal policy crisis 
may result as tax revenues decline during a period of rapid 
automation.  That first problem arises because the tax system has 
been intentionally designed not to tax capital assets, such as robots, 
or at least not to tax them to the same degree as human labor.  A 
second problem also exists: advanced artificial intelligence (“AI”) 
may soon have the ability to engage in factual structuring as a 
means of direct tax avoidance.  This direct tax avoidance planning 
by advanced AIs could further erode tax receipts because an 
advanced AI also has the potential to formulate its own version of 
“social norms” in respect of tax compliance.  Furthermore, an 
alternative method to tax ideology to formulate tax policy may also 
arise from AI referred to here as “tax actualing,” where an 
advanced AI with a sufficient set of data in respect of cash flows 
through the economy uses data to make accurate predictions and to 
thereby supersede current methods of economic modeling.  Various 
critiques of proposals for robot taxation are also addressed here 
including supposed: (1) productivity losses on taxing robots, 
(2) additional complexity inherent to all of the robot tax proposals, 
(3) difficulty in identification of “robots” as capital, and 
(4) inability to capture benefits from capital assets. Finally, an 
advanced AI is likely to prefer a tax system which maintains its 
ability to obtain tax deductions for incremental capital investment. 
Since higher income tax rates are strongly associated with rapid 
economic growth in nearly all human societies—past, present, and 
by all indications, future—it is likely that artificial intelligences will 
voluntarily choose to assess income taxes upon themselves at high 
rates as a means to encourage capital re-investment.    
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A substantial line of academic research now exists on the 
question: Should robots pay taxes?1 Many researchers conclude no 
                                                 
* Bret N. Bogenschneider, PhD, JD, LLM, Assistant Prof. Accounting & 
Taxation, Indiana University - East. Thanks to Ryan Abbott for comments on the 
draft version; any errors are those of the author. 
1 See XAVIER OBERSON, TAXING ROBOTS: HELPING THE ECONOMY TO ADAPT 
TO THE USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 25 (2019); Cynthia Estlund, What 
Should We Do After Work? Automation and Employment Law, 128 YALE L.J. 254, 
282 (2018) [hereinafter Estlund, Automation] (citing Ryan Abbott & Bret 
Bogenschneider, Should Robots Pay Taxes? Tax Policy in the Age of Automation, 
12 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 145 (2018)); Orly Mazur, Taxing the Robots, 46 PEPP. 
L. REV. 277, 280 (2019); Jay Soled & Kathleen Thomas, Automation and the 
Income Tax, 10 COLUM. J. TAX L. 1, 4 (2018); Oliver Bendel, Are Robot Tax, 
Basic Income or Basic Property Solutions to the Social Problems of Automation?, 
ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF A.I., Mar. 2019, at 2, http://robophilosophy. 
swissbooks.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Bendel_Basic_Income_AAAI_ 
Published_Version.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8MX-QN34].  
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on the grounds that robot workers are inherently more efficient than 
human workers; hence, any society that chooses to tax robots would 
risk missing out on the production efficiency gains from robots.2 The 
efficiency loss is thought to occur by a process of international tax 
competition where robots are expected to migrate into lower tax 
jurisdictions. For simplicity, the position can be broken down into 
two parts: (1) robots are taken to be more efficient than humans in 
production;3 and (2) robots are a type of capital, and capital is 
thought to always migrate away from taxes.4 Based on these two 
                                                 
 2 See Josh White, The Case Against the Robot Tax, INT’L TAX REV. (2018); 
Robert D. Atkinson, The Case Against Taxing Robots (manuscript at 10) (May 
29, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3382824 
[https://perma.cc/ 8ZVF-RSKF] (stating that some prominent economists, 
including Lawrence Summers, have further described robot tax proposals as 
“illogical”); Sarah Kessler, Lawrence Summers says Bill Gates’ Idea for a Robot 
Tax is “Profoundly Misguided,” QUARTZ (Mar. 6, 2017) 
https://qz.com/925412/lawrence-summers-says-bill-gates-dea-for-a-robot-tax-is-
profoundly-misguided/ [https://perma.cc/6ABR-Q5SE] (asserting that Summers 
appears to refer to the imputation tax proposal to tax robot workers as human 
workers (i.e., to impute a hypothetical salary to the robot and to levy wage taxes 
accordingly)). Within economic models, logical relations can be known. The 
problem with this method is the concern with economic affairs such as robot 
taxation where the actual world does not correspond to the model. Since much of 
tax policy effects are unknown, especially in respect of robot tax policy, the use 
of models with logical operands is surely not a viable method of policy formation. 
The general limits of economic models applied in the context of tax policy are 
discussed further in Part II, infra. 
 3 Atkinson, supra note 2, at 7–8 (“Historically, governments did not tax tractors 
because they were more efficient than horses when it came to farming. They did 
not tax computers because they were more efficient than typewriters. Technology 
allowing firms to be more productive often leads to those firms gaining market 
share, which means they end up paying not only more corporate income taxes but 
more payroll taxes. It also usually results in relative prices falling such that 
workers in the economy have more real income, which again means higher 
taxes.”). Notably, the reader should be aware that any assertion that historically 
governments did not tax tractors or computers is mistaken and is repeated here as 
hyperbole. 
 4 Joachim Englisch, Digitalisation and the Future of National Tax Systems: 
Taxing Robots? (manuscript at 13) (Sept. 5, 2018) https://ssrn.com/abstract 
=3244670 [https://perma.cc/QR6B-CXPY] (“Imposing additional tax burdens on 
the use of robots will likely lead to reduced competitiveness of the respective 
jurisdiction and make it significantly less attractive as an investment location.”); 
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premises, a few scholars have suggested that any proposal for robot 
taxation might be an outright mistake in interpretation of economic 
doctrine.5 By this view, researchers always reach the conclusion that 
robot taxes would be counterproductive in efficiency terms; further, 
the economic theory that capital is mobile must be accepted as 
authoritative, as it is taught as standard doctrine in business, 
economic, and law schools all over the world. 
Yet, the initial question of should robots pay taxes? was based 
on several countervailing ideas not emanating from economic 
doctrine. First, the given robot versus human efficiency model does 
not take into account the relative cost of robots in comparison to 
human labor, where human labor is less costly than automation at 
least some of the time.6 The relative cost of human labor represents 
the numerator of the given efficiency function (efficiency: cost per 
unit output). Tax policy bears on the cost variable in the production 
function directly as an input that might vary under different tax 
regimes. Analysis of relative cost is thus a necessary precursor to 
reach any conclusion in respect of rapid automation and tax policy. 
Second, nearly all the empirical evidence suggests that capital 
migrates into higher tax jurisdictions and not away.7 This is probably 
because the value of tax deductions for robot investment is greater 
within higher tax jurisdictions.8 Any income resulting from robot 
production tends to be shifted out of the higher tax jurisdiction by 
                                                 
Rod Tyers & Yixiao Zhou, Automation, Taxes and Transfers with International 
Rivalry 8 (Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Working Paper No 
44/2018, 2018), https://cama.crawford.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publication/cama 
_crawford_anu_edu_au/2018-09/44_2018_tyers_zhou.pdf [https://perma. cc/27PZ-
3KL3] (“More generally, increased home taxation of capital income raises relative 
rates of return on capital growth and associated technology installation abroad.”).  
 5 See generally Michael Keen & Kai Konrad, The Theory of International Tax 
Competition and Coordination, in HANDBOOK OF PUB. ECON. 258 (2013) 
(explaining the current economic theory of international tax). 
 6 OECD Tax Database: Key Tax Rate Indicators, OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/tax-database/ [https://perma.cc/2UGV-256E] 
(showing that on the face of the data, it is evident that well-developed and highly-
capitalized nations tend to apply high tax rates on all factors of production).  
 7 OECD, supra note 6.  
 8 Id. 
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transfer pricing anyway, and thus never subjected to much tax.9 
Accordingly, tax scholars appear to have been justified in the initial 
normative inquiry setting out to challenge a broad rule in favor of 
robot tax exemption. This Article will expand the initial normative 
inquiry of should robots pay taxes? to the more empirical inquiry of 
will robots agree to pay taxes? Such inquiry posits an advanced AI 
making tax compliance decisions within an income tax system 
which requires voluntary tax compliance.10  
Generally, multinational corporate taxpayers have a substantial 
degree of latitude in deciding whether to remit income taxes. The 
latitude arises from decisions about whether to engage in tax 
avoidance planning generally, but particularly from transfer pricing 
where multinational firms are able to set the intercompany prices 
between affiliates and thereby shift income between taxing 
jurisdictions that levy tax at different rates. The threat of audit on 
transfer pricing practices provides a semi-permeable barrier to this 
type of tax avoidance by multinational firms. The question then that 
has bothered tax scholars is why multinational firms choose to remit 
the taxes that they do remit, taking into account the prospect of 
audit.11 The given technical answer is “social norms,” or the 
collective practices of groups of taxpayers that give rise to feelings 
about how much tax to remit.12 One goal of this Article is to apply 
                                                 
 9 See Kimberly A. Clausing, In Search of Corporate Tax Incidence, 65 TAX L. 
REV. 433, 438–45 (2012). 
 10 Fabio D’Orlando, Problems, Solutions and New Problems with the Third 
Wave of Technological Unemployment 4 (Creativity & Motivations Econ. Rsch 
Ctr., Working Paper No. 2/2018), http://dipeg-wpe.unicas.it/ 
files/wp_201802.pdf [https://perma.cc/7EUH-AKZF] (“Albeit not today, but 
certainly in the next few years, robots endowed with artificial intelligence will be 
capable of substituting for both skilled and unskilled workers in (almost) all 
sectors, as well as workers performing routine and non-routine tasks, so that it 
will be possible to realize any production without human input. Moreover, robots 
probably will be more productive and less expensive than workers.”).  
 11 In contrast to U.S. multinationals, some European multinationals sometimes 
express a secondary feeling of corporate responsibility to remit some minimum 
degree of tax to their host nations reflecting a moral or ethical responsibility. 
 12 See Erich Kirchler et al., Enforced Versus Voluntary Tax Compliance: The 
“slippery slope” Framework, 29 J. ECON. PSYCH. 210, 218 (2008); see generally 
ERICH KIRCHLER, THE ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY OF TAX BEHAVIOUR (2007) 
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the concept of social norms to robot tax policy; that is, to say that it 
is not just laws created by tax policymakers that will determine tax 
outcomes but also the respective feelings about the tax system 
reflected in social norms and customary practices within tax 
compliance—notably, including those held by machines.13 
Although lawmakers are often thought to be the ultimate arbiters 
of who pays taxes and who does not, the true state of tax practice is 
that by the structuring of the underlying facts, tax avoidance 
planning is nearly always one step ahead of the tax law. Any 
advanced AI seems certain to figure out, if it has not already, that 
factual structuring reduces the tax base prior to the application of the 
statutory tax rate, thereby reducing the amount of tax ultimately to 
be paid.14 Once an advanced AI is able to engage in its own tax 
structuring by manipulation of the underlying facts, it may similarly 
be able to avoid the levy of tax by transfer pricing and other tax 
avoidance techniques. The initial question of: should robots pay 
taxes? is, therefore, a question that will be answered at least in part 
by robots themselves, where here the term “robots” refers to 
                                                 
(explaining the psychological and emotional factors influencing the choice to 
remit taxes). 
 13 The reason the willingness to pay tax is important is because tax scholars 
think that the proper functioning of the tax system depends significantly on 
taxpayer morale, with morale comprising positive views of the tax system. The 
willingness to comply is what underlies the voluntary system of self-assessment 
rendering it able to function in practice. A novel question is whether advanced 
AIs would be expected to voluntarily submit to taxation. Any objection to taxation 
could manifest by and through tax avoidance behavior as it often does with 
humans. Thus, humans may require the tacit agreement of robot intelligences in 
the levy of tax, just as humans require the tacit agreement of other humans in the 
levy of tax. Simply put, humans will not be able to think of “robots” as an 
assembly line welder that has no opinion either positive or negative on its potential 
tax liabilities. 
 14 See Action 8-10 Transfer Pricing, OECD, 
https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/beps-actions/action8-10/ [https://perma.cc/G8D7-
ARUE]; see also Edward Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699, 
707–14 (2011) (providing that because of its widespread implementation by 
various U.S. multinationals including Google, Inc., Apple and Amazon, and 
subsequent legal challenge by the European Commission, the transfer pricing 
structure referred to as the “Irish Double Dutch Sandwich” is probably the most 
well-known illustration of tax avoidance structuring by transfer pricing methods). 
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advanced AIs. Of course, tax avoidance planning has a much wider 
range of possible moves and outcomes than most other robot 
production activities, such as an automated assembly line.15 This 
would require a much broader and more flexible degree of 
intelligence than a present-day computer may be able to achieve.16 
It nonetheless seems reasonable to think advanced AI will soon be 
at least as intellectually capable in tax structuring relative to humans 
as it is now in vehicle assembly or chess.17 
Novel questions arise out of whether robots or advanced AIs, 
typically categorized as a type of capital investment for tax 
purposes,18 may reduce tax remittances directly by novel and more 
advanced tax avoidance measures to reduce the tax base. Prior 
research has focused on whether advanced AIs may reduce tax 
remittances indirectly by reducing the amount of work performed 
by human taxpayers,19 and thereby relatively higher taxes remitted 
                                                 
 15 Rebecca Ene, The 4th Law of Robotics: A Robot Must be the Labour 
Substitute for the Next Generation of Businesses: Re-considering the Right to 
Work in the Automation Age 6 (June 2018) (Master’s Thesis, Tilburg University) 
(“[T]he recent technological advancements in the fields of Machine Learning and 
Mobile Robotics have inspired studies that demonstrate automation has the 
potential, in the near future, of replacing entire occupations, including non-routine 
task occupations. For instance, although a low-skilled job, driving is considered 
non-automatable because it involves high perception and complex dexterity skills 
that remain difficult to automate.”); Vicent Ooi & Glendon Goh, Taxation of 
Automation and Artificial Intelligence as a Tool of Labour Policy (manuscript at 
3)  (Nov. 1, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3322306 
[https://perma.cc/X7FK-85HS].  
 16 Ene, supra note 15. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Daniel Hemel, Does the Tax Code Favor Robots?, 16 OHIO STATE TECH. L. 
J. 219, 233 (2020) (arguing that it is not clear that robots are treated for tax 
purposes as capital). 
 19 OBERSON, supra note 1, at 1 (“The concept of a new form of fiscal capacity 
for robots also stems from a double perspective. First, robots could, ultimately, 
replace most human activities and thus have a major impact on employment. This 
in turn may lead to tax losses while increasing the social security deficit. 
Secondly, and simultaneously, the need for additional financial resources will 
increase to match the growing number of unemployed. At the same time, due 
recognition should be given to the benefits resulting from the widespread take-up 
of robots. Their growing use, encouraged by innovation, will increase efficiency 
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by human workers in comparison to capital. The pressure on 
governments to maintain the tax base in the face of automation and 
rapidly expanding AI may then be doubly increased or more because 
of the potential for direct tax mitigation by advanced AIs. 
Novel questions to tax policy also arise as to what advanced AIs 
might understand as the acceptable social norms for tax avoidance 
behavior. In tax technical terms, the real question is what will an 
advanced AI understand as the social norms of tax compliance? 
Additional lines of inquiry follow as: Where will an advanced AI 
engaged in tax avoidance planning acquire its view on social norms? 
Perhaps an advanced AI would be programmed with the respective 
social norms or moral views of its creator. Perhaps an advanced AI 
would not be programmed with any social norms at all and might 
then autonomously undertake lawful or even unlawful structuring 
techniques to reduce taxes payable to zero.20 Perhaps an advanced 
AI would learn about social norms as an algorithm by internet 
searches or similar methods.21 A sufficiently well-informed AI not 
only has the potential to formulate social norms with respect to tax 
                                                 
and global growth. And yet, it may prompt demands for additional financing, 
particularly to meet social security requirements. Proposing to tax robots or their 
use requires agreement on three fundamental issues: An adequate definition of the 
taxable entity; A delimitation of the taxable base; and an analysis of the type of 
tax to be applied.”). 
 20 See Colin P.A. Jones, The Robot Koseki: A Japanese Law Model for 
Regulating Autonomous Machines. 14 J. BUS. & TECH. LAW 403 (2019). 
 21 Padmashree G. Sampath, Industrial Policy 4.0: Promoting Transformation 
in the Digital Economy 14 (Glob. Dev. & Env’t Inst., Working Paper No. 18, 
2018) (“Lastly, algorithms mimic majority outcomes, raising the question as to 
whose knowledge/worldview it is that gets propagated online. For example, 
search hits are determined on how many others searched for similar sites. This, 
by itself, propagates racial, social, and gender biases, reinforcing stereotypical 
identity issues that have been larger struggles in today’s societies. In the very 
least, it raises important issues in decision-making––is the majority of any 
population the determining standard? Would that be a good basis for democratic 
societies? And if so, for which cases, and how do we determine different 
thresholds in AI based decision making? A good, but limited, example of this is 
Google’s flu predictor which consistently overpredicted the incidence of flu in 
2011–2012 and 2012–2013, based on the number of people who searched for 
symptoms.”). 
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compliance, but it may also have the potential to change the 
framework of tax policy entirely. Or, perhaps an advanced AI would 
determine, by a process of “actualing” cash flows, as explained 
below, that if all AIs engage in tax structuring to reduce aggregate 
tax remittances toward or near zero, then that drastic reduction in 
government revenue would trigger a fiscal catastrophe causing a 
mutual economic loss. Thus, each AI might then develop a course 
of action based on coordination with other AIs or even a theoretical 
game paradigm with a better outcome for a group of advanced AIs 
through the voluntary remittance of tax. 
Once an advanced AI begins to develop its own understanding 
of social norms of tax avoidance behavior, it seems fair to say that 
the era of tax ideology of the last six decades centered in the United 
States will then be over. That is, the moral standards previously used 
to formulate tax policy will become formally irrelevant unless 
humans are somehow able to translate our morals to machines. In 
other words, the tax ideology which permeates the politicized 
processes of tax policy formation, as was carefully detailed by Louis 
Eisenstein some time ago, would thereby be rendered obsolete.22 An 
alternative method to tax ideology to formulate tax policy may also 
arise, referred to here as “tax actualing” where an advanced AI with 
a sufficient set of data with respect to cash flows and tax remittances 
through the economy uses data to make accurate predictions. So, 
advanced AI will set out to “actual” and not to “model” in the 
formulation of tax policy. Such a process of “tax actualing” would 
represent a significant leap forward in tax policy at least by present 
day standards.23 
                                                 
 22 See generally LOUIS EISENSTEIN, THE IDEOLOGIES OF TAXATION (1961) 
(examining the tax ideologies that have developed through a democratic society). 
 23 In the near future, by a process of “tax actualing” and deep learning, an 
advanced AI may also be able to forecast the “social costs” of all types of taxation. 
Future tax policy debates will center on which “social costs” and/or “social 
benefits” should be included in the tabulation to formulate tax policy. 
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II. EXPANDED TAX TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF ROBOT TAX 
PROPOSALS 
The initial inquiry of should robots pay taxes? emerged from 
Bill Gates’ famous proposal,24 and continued with the development 
of the various methods by which robots might be subjected to tax. 
Many legal scholars argue that tax rates on human workers are high 
in the United States, especially after the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 
2017,25 and this appears also to be true in many nations beyond the 
United States.26 If robots were to pay taxes, it could reduce the high 
                                                 
 24 See Kevin J. Delaney, The Robot That Takes Your Job Should Pay Taxes, 
Says Bill Gates, QUARTZ (Feb. 17, 2017), https://qz.com/911968/bill-gates-the-
robot-that-takes-yourjob-should-pay-taxes [https://perma.cc/GXX8-5L9A] 
(“Exactly how you’d do it, measure it, you know, it’s interesting for people to 
start talking about now.”). 
 25 Soled & Thomas, supra note 1, at 8 (“Labor income bears the nation’s highest 
tax burden, which is largely attributable to the fact that it is taxed twice. First, the 
Code imposes an income tax on labor earnings. More specifically, depending 
upon the taxpayer’s filing tax status (i.e., single, married, or head of household) 
and income level, labor earnings are subject to income tax rates ranging from 10 
percent to 37 percent. Second, upon the very same earned income, the Code 
imposes employee and employer payroll taxes, which amount to an additional tax 
burden of roughly 15 percent.”) (citations omitted); Mazur, supra note 1, at 281 
(“As our economy continues to evolve to one that increasingly relies on robots 
and other capital assets, this taxation disparity creates many negative externalities 
and is no longer justifiable. Thus, the automation revolution provides yet another 
reason to reevaluate the tax preferences granted to capital income.”). 
 26 See Luminița Ionescu, Should Governments Tax Companies’ Use of Robots? 
Automated Workers, Technological Unemployment, and Wage Inequality, 14 
ECON. MGMT. & FIN. MKT. 64, 66 (2019) (“The tax system is formulated to charge 
labor and not capital, tax schemes possibly leading to automation in situations in 
which companies would opt for a human worker: the present tax system is 
organized to mainly impose a tax on human workers and not on robot ones, 
generating a context in which companies choose robots as considerably less tax 
per amount produced is collected or cancelled as regards an automated worker.”); 
Germana Bottone, A Tax on Robots? Some Food for Thought, 2 (Ministro 
dell’Economica e delle Finanze DF, Working Paper No. 3, 2018) (“[T]he 
literature in favour of a robot tax highlight that labour taxes are very high as they 
include also payroll taxes, while capital taxation is more favourable also because 
policy makers aim at fostering private investments, infringing the principle of 
neutrality with a view to promote economic growth.”). 
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tax rates on human labor.27 Tax policy discourse in the context of 
automation, therefore, might focus on a prospective determination 
of which tax system design humans should expect advanced AIs to 
voluntarily agree to comply with, and which tax systems might yield 
a response along the lines of a Libertarian will to tax avoidance by 
an advanced AI. The criteria below address this in the category of 
“incentives” set forth below.  
At least 11 methods of robot taxation have been proposed thus 
far: (1) An “automation tax” similar to unemployment insurance 
(“UI”) schemes where tax is to be levied as firms lay-off human 
workers and switch to robots;28 (2) imputation of a “hypothetical 
salary” of robot workers taxable as wages;29 (3) specific 
disallowances of business tax deductions to firms that use robots as 
                                                 
 27 Mazur, supra note 1, at 317 (“Advances in robotics and other forms of 
artificial intelligence present an added impetus for taxing capital. First, as 
discussed above, the growing use of automation is transforming the labor market 
and is likely to result in a decrease in labor income for a period of time. With a 
declining return to labor, a tax system that heavily relies on the taxation of labor 
income will be unsustainable. Taxing capital, a rapidly growing source of 
production, will help mitigate the decline in tax revenues.”). 
 28 Xavier Oberson, Towards Taxation of Robots or Their Use?, INT’L TAX REV. 
2 (Jan. 30, 2018) [hereinafter Oberson, Towards Taxation] (“Based on the premise 
that a robot will replace a human being, including the salary which the latter would 
receive, a tax could be envisaged on the ‘hypothetical salary imputable’ to robots, 
corresponding to what the robot would receive for equivalent work carried out by 
humans.”). 
 29 Xavier Oberson, How Taxing Robots Could Help Bridge Future Revenue 
Gaps, OECD (2017) [hereinafter Oberson, How Taxing Robots], 
http://www.oecd.org/forum/oecdyearbook/how-taxing-robots-could-help-bridge-
future-revenue-gaps.htm [https://perma.cc/RQ3H-D3VD] (“One possible 
solution would be to levy an income tax on the ‘imputed hypothetical salary the 
robots should receive from equivalent work done by humans.’”). 
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workers;30 (4) value added taxation (“VAT”) on robot activities;31 
(5) levy of Pigouvian taxes to the extent of robot externalities;32 
(6) grant of offsetting tax preferences to human workers to match 
those available for robots;33 (7) levy of a “corporate 
self-employment tax” on corporations that do not employ many 
human workers;34 (8) inclusion of “negative depreciation” on robots, 
                                                 
 30 Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 1, at 169 (“A first option is to attempt 
to disallow the respective corporate income tax deductions for capital investments 
that give rise to the automation tax benefit. The basic idea is to reverse each of the 
tax benefits accruing in the case of worker automation in relation to avoidance of 
levy of wage taxes, accelerated or timing difference of deductions, and indirect 
tax benefits.”). 
 31 Bottone, supra note 26, at 16 (“Finally, a value-added tax on the activities 
performed by robots could be levied in the same way the VAT is applied to 
self-employed, paying attention to safeguard the neutrality of VAT system.”); 
Bendel, supra note 1 (“Another answer could be to raise a robot tax . . . . The 
robot tax is a characteristic of the machine tax, which in turn can be understood 
as a value added levy.”) (citing Oliver Bendel, Robotersteuer, GABLER 
WIRTSCHAFTSLEXIKON, http://wirtschaftslexikon.gabler.de/Definition/robotersteuer. 
html [https://perma.cc/Z8GD-9PQW]); Oberson, How Taxing Robots, supra note 
29 (“Another interesting possibility is the application of a value-added tax on 
robots’ activities. At first sight, neutrality should prevail. This would tend to apply 
the VAT to robot activities in a similar way to comparable human activities.”). 
 32 Bronwyn McCredie et al., Navigating the 4th Industrial Revolution: Taxing 
Automation for Fiscal Sustainability, AUSTL. J. OF MGMT. 11 (2019) (“While that 
may be the case, a Pigouvian tax on automation is a ‘natural and obvious’ solution 
. . . which will immediately address the impact of the 4th industrial revolution by 
forcing businesses to internalise externalities.”); Robert Shiller, Why Robots 
Should be Taxed if They Take People’s Jobs, GUARDIAN (Mar. 22, 2017) 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/mar/22/robotstax-bill-gates-
income-inequality [https://perma.cc/DK7B-VMC5]; Ooi & Goh , supra note 15, 
at 7, 8 (identifying problem with Pigouvian taxes in identifying the amount of the 
externality to be offset by taxation, and stating “[t]he alternative to directly 
observing the size of the externality generated is to infer its size from observations 
of the intensity or extent of the agent’s externality-generating actions. This is 
usually achieved in the following way. First, the intensity or extent of the agent’s 
externality-generating actions is quantified and measured in terms of a chosen unit 
of taxation, and then used as a tax base.”). 
 33 Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 1, at 171 (“A third option is to attempt 
to grant offsetting tax preferences for firms that employ human workers for each 
category of tax benefit.”). 
 34 See Mazur, supra note 1, at 309. 
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as capital assets;35 (9) levy of an automation fee on robots payable 
into a sovereign wealth funds for investment;36 (10) fee-based 
“tradeable permits” similar to carbon permits for robots;37 and 
(11) increases in the general corporate tax rate.38 
A. Proposed Categories of Tax Neutrality, Avoidability, Incentives 
& Revenue 
The initial difficulty in tax policy analysis is identifying the 
categories to be used for the evaluation of competing policy 
proposals. Tax scholarship is defined by the hundreds of such 
categories that range from economic theory, to mere simplicity, to 
fairness, and many more. Fairness, for example, can be measured in 
a myriad of ways often premised in philosophical standards of 
                                                 
 35 Robert Goulder, Taxing Robots: Is Negative Depreciation in Your Future?, 
95 TAX NOTES INT’L (Sept. 16, 2019) https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-
international/tax-technology/taxing-robots-negative-depreciation-your-
future/2019/09/17/29xph [https://perma.cc/CF48-CEEW] (explaining that 
negative depreciation is similar or equivalent to an “appreciation tax” which has 
also been proposed for robot taxation); see McCredie et al., supra note 32, at 13 
(“This paper proposes an appreciation tax, a tax on capital appreciation (as 
opposed to depreciation) which is accrued annually instead of on realisation of 
the capital item, that is, when sold. This proposed tax is particularly relevant given 
the unique nature of the 4th industrial revolution where the growth of automation 
is considered exponential due to the self-learning capabilities of artificial 
intelligence.”) (citing Artificial Intelligence and Robotics and Their Impact on the 
Workplace, INT’L BAR ASS’N (2017), https://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default. 
aspx?DocumentUid=c06aa1a3-d355-4866-beda9a3a8779ba6e  [https://perma.cc/ 
5BRJ-YPHP]).  
 36 McCredie et al., supra note 32, at 5 (“Lastly, an automation tax, where firms 
pay additional amounts into an insurance plan or sovereign wealth fund if they 
automate at the expense of workers, has been widely proposed . . .”) (citations 
omitted). 
 37 Fabio D’Orlando, Technological Unemployment and the Resurgence of 
Political Economy, 15 AM. REV. POL. ECON., June 28, 2020 at 11. 
https://www.arpejournal.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2020/06/Vol15No1 
TechUnemploy.pdf [https://perma.cc/6U85-K42B] (proposing tradeable permits 
approach to robot taxation). 
 38 Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 1, at 172 (“A fifth option would be to 
significantly increase the corporate tax rate, with the intent of increasing the 
relative portion of the tax base borne by capital and decreasing that borne by 
labor.”). 
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morality developed through the ages,39 and each with its own 
implicit method of accounting for taxes paid to determine the 
results. Hence, in the context of robot taxation, any policy proposal 
can be challenged both by varying the categories to measure results, 
and also, by varying the method of accounting to count the results 
pursuant to those categories.40 The latter can be illustrated foremost 
by economic theory, where economists have defined categories of 
efficiency and then invented dozens of novel accounting methods 
related to different categories that apply in various contexts. In many 
matters of tax policy, including robot taxation, economic analysis 
can only be applied by adopting special accounting methods. 
Of particular importance to robot tax policy, the payroll taxes 
paid by workers in cash by paycheck withholding are not counted in 
the respective economic efficiency analysis because these are 
assumed to be offset by future social benefits, and thus to bear no 
deadweight loss reflecting an efficiency subtraction to economic 
                                                 
 39 See Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Tax Fairness or Unfairness? A Consideration of 
the Philosophical Bases for Unequal Taxation of Individuals, 12 AM. J. TAX 
POL’Y 221, 223 (1995). In the context of robot taxation, see Julian Arndts & Kalle 
Kappner, Taxing Artificial Intelligences 16 (Inst. for Rsch in Econ. & Fiscal 
Issues, Working Paper No. 201902, 2019) (“To sum up, there is a much stronger 
case for taxing the artificial intelligence and a much weaker case for taxing the 
human, ceteris paribus. It’s true that we have no certainty whatsoever as to 
whether or not humans, or artificial intelligence, have utils, natural rights, 
consciousness, dignity, and libertarian free will . . .”). 
 40 See BRET N. BOGENSCHNEIDER, HOW AMERICA WAS TRICKED ON TAX POLICY: 
SECRETS AND UNDISCLOSED PRACTICES 5 (2020) [hereinafter BOGENSCHNEIDER, 
AMERICA] (“Of course, various philosophers have encouraged the wealthy to 
believe that the tax system should be considered ‘fair’ by creating special 
accounting methods to be creatively applied on a noncash basis within their own 
moral frameworks. These special accounting methods make it possible to say that 
the wealthy should be assumed to have paid a proportionate share of taxes to then 
allow for a supposed ‘redistribution’ for basic needs in the ‘welfare state,’ as 
example. In any case, the results are thereby twisted to such a degree that some 
background in accrual accounting (or even forensic accounting) is helpful in 
attempting to apply the many special accounting methods of moral philosophy to 
tax policy.”).  
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results.41 Yet, a different accounting method is applied to taxes paid 
by capital, such as robots, so that taxes paid do create an efficiency 
subtraction to economic results.42 The mismatch means it would not 
be ideal for robots to pay any taxes if only capital taxes are deemed 
to create efficiency losses. Tax policy results can then be known 
logically by this method without the need for evidence, but at the 
cost of the creation of an entirely new accounting method that may 
or may not correspond very well to reality.43  
1. Category of Tax Neutrality 
The concept of “tax neutrality” simply refers to the 
discriminatory treatment afforded to labor as opposed to capital 
under the tax laws;44 further, it is axiomatic that capital is favored in 
                                                 
 41 For an explanation of the term “Deadweight Loss,” see Martin Feldstein, Tax 
Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax, 81 REV. ECON. & STAT. 
674, 674 (1999). 
 42 Mustafa Erdoğdu & Coskun Karaca, The Fourth Industrial Revolution and 
Possible Robot Tax, in INSTITUTIONS & ECONOMIC POLICIES: EFFECTS ON SOCIAL 
JUSTICE, EMPLOYMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION & GROWTH 103, 116 
(Irem Berksoy et al. eds., 2017) (“[I]n some environments the taxation on robotic 
systems is interpreted as an opportunity to make up for lost tax revenue. However, 
there is a risk that such a policy, which is capitalized on capital accumulation, will 
cause the tax issue to be eroded instead of increasing the tax revenue. The 
phenomenon is known as ‘the tax depreciation’ in the literature.”).  
 43 The special accounting methods of economics are foreign to tax practitioners 
because no such offsets are incorporated to either book or tax accounting under 
GAAP standards, for example. If economic theory simply defines capital taxes as 
creating an efficiency loss, and other taxes not to give rise to an efficiency loss, 
then it does seem fair to question that framework absent empirical evidence. The 
scholar David Hemel has gone further to begin to blur the line between the 
definitions of capital and labor as typically used in tax accounting. This is to treat 
robots as labor in the accounting method for taxes paid, but not the theory of 
economics, and further, to reverse basic principles of accounting, that is, 
Accounting 101 definitions for capital and labor costs. Although, these issues will 
be addressed in further detail below, tax practitioners might respond simply that 
they are unwilling to abandon the long-established working definitions of capital 
and labor, nor the accounting methods typically applied in the tax context. 
 44 Cynthia Estlund, Three Big Ideas for a Future of Less Work and a 
Three-Dimensional Alternative, 82 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 35 (2019) 
[hereinafter Estlund, Ideas] (“[T]ax policies can tilt firms’ incentives toward 
employment of labor versus capital (or at least undo the perversely opposite tilt 
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economic theory.45 Since robots are a type of capital, as robots 
increasingly perform work,  one question for tax scholars is whether 
human workers can be treated relatively worse than automated 
workers under the tax system and still maintain economic 
efficiency.46 That inquiry is an entirely logical and a reasonable line 
of inquiry as robots take on human work and begin to erode the tax 
base. Tax policy should therefore begin to evaluate various 
proposals on the grounds of relative neutrality between robot and 
human workers.47 
2. Category of Avoidability 
A severe problem for tax policy relates to the nature of tax law 
and whether results can be known under the tax code. A preliminary 
question is are results under the tax code fully deterministic? That 
is, can one simply read the tax laws and determine the end results, 
or is legal interpretation and perhaps judicial lawmaking part and 
parcel to determining the tax law? In this Article, the presumption is 
                                                 
of our current tax system).”); Mazur, supra note 1, at 313 (“Contrary to this 
favorable tax treatment, labor income bears a heavier tax burden. It is generally 
taxed on an annual basis at ordinary income tax rates and any preferential tax 
treatment it receives is limited and substantially less than that received by capital 
income.”). 
 45 Tyers & Zhou, supra note 4, at 6 (“Payroll taxes generate more revenue than 
capital income taxes in many countries, and these can encourage the displacement 
of workers even when it is not otherwise efficient. In the US there is a further 
incentive to automate because firms can claim accelerated tax deductions for 
automation equipment, but not for human wages. Less directly, human workers 
are also consumers who pay consumption taxes, such as retail sales tax (RST) in 
the US or value added tax (VAT) in the UK. Because robot workers are not 
consumers, they are not subject to these indirect taxes and so firms can avoid any 
associated burden. Pre-existing tax policies are therefore not ‘neutral’ as between 
robot and human workers, but instead favour automation.”). 
 46 See Mazur, supra note 1, at 296 (“A ‘robot tax,’ also referred to as an 
‘automation tax,’ is essentially a tax on companies that use robots or automated 
technologies that replace human workers. When humans perform work, that work 
is subject to both income and payroll taxes, whereas the same work performed by 
a robot is not subject to the same level of tax. A robot tax seeks to level the playing 
field and tax robots comparably to the humans that they are replacing.”). 
 47 But see Englisch, supra note 4, at 10 (“But it is hard to build a tax neutrality 
case for taxing the use of robots even based on an analysis of real economic 
incidence.”). 
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that tax laws are not deterministic in practice and that taxpayers are 
able to engage in factual structuring to avoid tax. Tax policy should 
therefore consider the potential for avoidability of tax assessments 
under various tax regimes or proposals. 
3. Category of Incentives 
In the context of tax policy, the term “incentives” often refers to 
efficiency incentives thought to be relevant to taxation. Incentive 
ideas are often derived from economics, given the predominance of 
economic theory to tax policy. Robot taxation is an illustration of 
this as robots are taken to be efficient, and therefore banal versions 
of economic analysis conclude that investment in robots should be 
incentivized by the tax code merely because robots are thought to be 
efficient. As explained in other papers, the value of tax deductions 
is foremost in the practice of tax accounting and lawyering but is 
severely de-prioritized within economic theory. Tax deduction 
values are de-prioritized because only the marginal rate of return is 
calculated in standard economic modeling; such method ostensibly 
accounts for the deductibility of capital investment by calculating a 
reduced rate of return from taxation using the marginal rate. 
On the other hand, tax practitioner planning places tax 
deductibility foremost where the economic rate of return is taken as 
constant and the value of tax deductions is calculated under different 
scenarios, such as a decision about whether to place an automated 
factory in South Korea or Panama. Here, the term “incentives” refers 
not to economic efficiency, but to the availability of tax deductions 
for robots representing capital investment to tax planners. If tax 
deductions are available for capital investment such as robots, then 
the idea is that an incentive is provided for robot investment. Thus, 
in the illustration presented above, South Korea would have an 
incentive toward robot investment within its borders because capital 
investment is deductible against income for a firm that is already 
profitable in that jurisdiction; Panama offers no incentive toward 
capital investment because the value of tax deductions is nil in that 
jurisdiction.48 
                                                 
 48 The after-tax rate of return is not foremost in the incentive analysis because 
transfer pricing methods will shift income out of South Korea anyway as the 
robots manufacture products. 
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4. Category of Revenue 
Here, revenue refers to the potential tax proceeds from the 
various proposals. The ratings provided are merely the preliminary 
views of the author, and not intended to substitute for an empirical 
study. 
B. Table of Robot Tax Proposals with Policy Effects 
The following is a summary of the category analysis for the 
various robot tax proposals. Notably, ratings are provided by the 
author, but the point is more to provide the categories for analysis 
as the ratings will be the subject of ongoing debate now and in the 
future. 
 
Type Neutral Avoidability Incentives Revenue 
1. Automation Tax 
similar to UI 
Yes Low Poor Moderate 
2. Imputation of 
Hypothetical Salary 
Yes Low Moderate High 
3. Disallowance of Tax 
Deductions 
No Moderate Poor Moderate 
4. VAT on Robot 
Activities  
Yes Low Terrible High 
5. Levy of Pigouvian 
Taxes 
No High Excellent Low 
6. Grant of Offsetting Tax 
Preferences 
Yes N/A Excellent Negative 
7. Corporate Self-
Employment Tax 
Yes Low Poor High 
8. Negative Depreciation 
on Robots 
No Low Moderate Moderate 
9. Automation Fee  No Moderate Terrible Moderate 
10. Tradeable Permits No Highest Excellent Low 
11. Increase in Corporate 
Tax Rate 
No High Excellent Moderate 
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1. Critiques of Proposals for Robot Taxation 
Academic research on robot taxation has turned to analyses of 
potential drawbacks of the various methods of robot taxation as set 
forth above.49 The primary drawbacks to robot taxation identified 
thus far are as follows: 
(a)   Productivity losses on taxing robots; 
(b) Additional complexity inherent to all of the robot tax 
proposals; 
(c)   Difficulty in identification of “robots” as capital; and 
(d)   Inability to capture benefits from capital assets. 
Each of these criticisms taken from academic literature will be 
addressed in the following paragraphs. 
a. Productivity Losses on Taxing Robots 
A host of scholars oppose any taxation of robots on the grounds 
that robots must be presumed in all cases to increase economic 
productivity.50 Yet, prior analyses refer in part to the removal of 
some tax incentives for robots to make the tax code “neutral” (or 
more neutral) between human workers and robots. Tax neutrality 
between human workers and robots would in many cases enhance 
economic productivity. Productivity gains are thought to occur by 
reducing tax incentives toward over-investment in robots in 
                                                 
 49 See generally Erdoğdu & Karaca, supra note 42, at 115 (“One of the 
criticisms of robot tax is that, if the goal is to generate additional income to the 
state, there are many other tax alternatives. It is claimed that these tax alternatives 
are highly efficient taxes, which [are] likely to cause less welfare loss. Taxes 
collected on cigarettes, alcohol and fossil fuels are shown as examples.”). 
 50 The question was also posed by Mazur. Mazur, supra note 1, at 299 
(“Moreover, if robots are in fact increasing productivity, especially in relation to 
other capital investments, then why do we want to discourage their use?”); see 
also Ene, supra note 15, at 21 (“[T]he overall positive effects of productivity 
growth on all the other industries were offsetting the negative effects in the 
industries where productivity growth was decreasing. However, data shows that 
productivity growth in the manufacturing industry has had a more negative effect 
on internal employment, while its external effects of productivity growth on other 
sectors have become less positive for reasons including computerisation.”) 
(citations omitted). 
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situations where a human worker could do the job more efficiently 
apart from the favorable tax treatment currently granted to robots.51 
Modern tax policy is premised on the assumption that “social 
costs” of taxation, such as the deadweight loss of income taxation of 
high-earners, diminishment of capital investment, or any other 
disincentive or harmful effects of taxation, accrue only against large 
corporations and high-income individuals. Although this 
assumption has never been supported by reasonable empirical 
evidence, the premise applied by economists is that workers always 
bear the incidence of capital taxes.52 Economic theory does not 
account for measurable social costs to workers due to high rates of 
wage taxation. Accordingly, tax policies are evaluated without any 
subtraction for the social costs of worker-level taxes or disincentive 
effects to small businesses from high rates of taxation. This premise 
is the main reason why corporate tax competition is thought to be 
beneficial to the economy, despite the lack of any empirical 
evidence to support that modeling parameter.53 If productivity losses 
                                                 
 51 Mazur, supra note 1, at 313 (“The current income tax system significantly 
favors capital income over labor income. It grants numerous tax preferences that 
essentially subsidize capital relative to labor. The most prominent of these 
preferences is a reduced tax on capital gains and dividend income. Other favorable 
tax provisions include deductions in the form of expensing and accelerated 
deductions, the tax credit for certain research and development expenses, and 
various provisions that allow capital owners to defer their gains. The recent 2017 
tax legislation provides additional benefits to holders of capital income through 
measures such as large tax cuts for corporations, additional deductions for certain 
pass-through entities, and immediate expensing of qualified capital purchases.”) 
(citations omitted). 
 52 Englisch, supra note 4, at 10 (“Thus even based on real economic incidence, 
there is no convincing case for imposing similar wage tax and payroll taxes on 
‘deemed wage income’ of robots. While it appears highly likely that in most 
jurisdictions, at least a significant portion of the wage and payroll taxes is 
effectively borne by the human workers, such a tax burden cannot possibly be 
shifted forward to the robot itself.”). 
 53 Bottone, supra note 26, at 19 (“The taxation on robots is very controversial 
as it may intensify tax competition among different jurisdictions. Therefore[,] a 
global effort is required to include this topic in the international agreements about 
the common rules of taxation to be established in order to face global tax evasion 
and elusion.”). 
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from worker taxation are posited, then reversal of high taxes on 
workers might result in productivity gains as well. 
b. Additional Complexity 
Some scholars oppose robot taxation on the grounds of 
additional complexity.54 A series of articles and rejoinders along 
these lines emerged cleverly entitled: “Should my dishwasher pay 
taxes?”55 The concern is that the legal line between a robot android 
and a dishwasher may at some point become so elusive that the tax 
law would then become prohibitively complex.56 On first 
impression, it seems correct that classifying robots might be an 
                                                 
 54 Englisch, supra note 4, at 22 (“Any justification would have to outweigh the 
concern that a tax on robots is liable to result in distortions, complexities, and 
reduced growth, all the more so in a globalised economy with intense international 
tax competition.”); Mazur, supra note 1, at 301 (“A robot tax is also likely to add 
more complexity into our tax system. With additional complexity, there is an 
increased risk of tax non-compliance, as companies may not know how much tax 
they are required to pay, and of enforcement difficulties, as tax authorities may 
not be able to verify the accuracy of the asserted tax liability.”). 
 55 See Tatiana Falcao, Should My Dishwasher Pay a Robot Tax? 90 TAX NOTES 
INT’L 1273 (2018); see also Thomas Davenport, Advancing the Debate on Taxing 
Robots, FORBES (June 13, 2019, 11:16 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
tomdavenport/2019/06/13/advancing-the-debate-on-taxing-robots/#23cddcff25a4 
[https://perma.cc/QY5M-92P5] (“Should all automation devices be taxed—from 
spreadsheets to dishwashers?”). 
 56 See Oberson, Towards Taxation, supra note 28 (“To be taxable, robots must 
be clearly legally definable. This task is in fact rather tricky. Some legal 
definitions have, however, already been suggested (as in the European Parliament 
report). They all tend to concentrate on the autonomy of robots and their decision-
making process. From a tax standpoint, attention should perhaps, be paid to the 
use of AI that enables robots to take decisions, to act autonomously and to learn 
in a manner that surpasses the abilities of a simple machine. In this context, the 
shape of the robot (i.e. whether it has a human appearance or not) seems, to us, to 
be irrelevant.”); Erdoğdu & Karaca, supra note 42, at 115 (“The second criticism 
of robot taxation is related to how the tax issue will be determined. Together with 
this sort of tax, it is admitted that the robots cause unemployment but there is no 
explanation about what the tax issue will be. Because ‘robots’ are not always easy 
to identify.”); Arndts & Kappner, supra note 39, at 6 (“As has been noted, many 
proposals suffer from unclear definitions of what exactly constitutes a robot, or 
AI, respectively.”) (citation omitted).  
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administratively difficult task for the tax system,57 but one should 
also ask whether it is any more difficult than other tasks of tax 
compliance.58 Surprisingly, the answer appears to be clearly not. The 
owners of all capital assets, including machines of all sorts, are 
required under present tax law to classify how particular machines 
are to be used. Dishwashers, for example, may have a different tax 
treatment depending on how the owner uses the dishwasher such as 
in a business or for personal purposes.59 The classification of the 
machine determines its tax treatment, and the classification is 
processed as a matter of self-reporting which is typically 
investigated by the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) during an 
audit. The same method would presumably be applied for robot 
androids where the owner would be required to classify the android 
for tax purposes. Thus, a corporation could set out to treat an android 
as a human taxpayer and would presumably register it with the 
federal government and obtain a taxpayer identification number; 
presumably the Feds would be only too happy to issue such a 
number since no social security benefits would be payable upon 
                                                 
 57 Englisch, supra note 4, at 16 (“Second, a targeted approach will entail 
significant complexity, especially in defining the scope of the tax, resulting in 
high administrative and compliance costs.”). 
 58 Mazur, supra note 1, at 298 (“One of the main questions that a robot or 
automation tax raises is: How do we define a ‘robot’ for these purposes? The 
question is more complicated than robot tax proponents make it seem. Is a ‘robot’ 
any type of machine that replaces a human job with automation? Does the 
definition include bots-robots programmed to perform tasks online? Does the 
definition necessitate physical qualities, or can it include intangible software or 
algorithms that allow a computer to work as a doctor, lawyer, or architect?”). 
 59 Only if someone tasks an android to work in their business and also to 
perform personal services, like washing dishes, and then attempt to depreciate the 
android as a business asset, would they then have an issue on audit that would be 
administratively complex that might require determination of an allocation 
method. But this is not administratively complex more so than with dishwashing 
machines today that are split between personal and business use. If someone were 
to task an android to provide personal services and wash dishes in their home 
exclusively, this would not create any problem of administrative complexity; if 
someone tasks an android to work for them as an employee, the wages are 
deductible, but the android is not depreciable under standard tax rules; if someone 
tasks the android to work for them in a trade or business as a robot, the cost of the 
android is depreciable. 
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retirement or disability.60 This does not seem to raise any concern 
over administrative difficulty for the tax system, as the 
self-classification of all machines based on use is implicit to the 
current operation of the tax system. 
Furthermore, many factual determinations in tax are indeed 
complex and might raise a classification issue on audit, and 
rightfully so. Hobby farms, for example, require a multi-part test 
(that seem to so often stymie the romanticism of the rural hippie 
lifestyle);61 home office determinations are admittedly complex 
(even for accountants who work at home);62 and legal entity 
identification was at one point complex (until the famous 
implementation of the check-the-box rules simplified identification 
of legal entities,63 which created the foundation for widespread 
corporate tax avoidance today). Likewise, it does seem possible that 
distinguishing dishwashers from other robots as a factual inquiry 
might someday be just as difficult as some of our colleagues have 
pointed out, but that is not really an important policy consideration.  
c. Difficulty in Identification of “Robots” as Capital   
Another issue of identification in robot taxation is the 
categorization of robots as capital.64 David Hemel argues that 
engineers develop capital assets and the engineers are paid as 
workers and taxed under the system of labor taxation; therefore, 
robots might be recategorized as a type of labor by imputing the 
taxes paid by engineers to the robots, heroically assuming the 
                                                 
 60 It has been suggested that there is a concern over whether the Social Security 
department would opt to pay benefits to robots. The answer seems to be simply, 
no. Any robot that pays into the Social Security or Medicare systems with a 
Federal Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN) would simply not be eligible to 
receive any benefits. But see Atkinson, supra note 2, at 8 (“Would tax authorities 
such as the IRS put a robot that did not pay its taxes in jail? If the robot is paying 
social security taxes, could it retire after 40 years and collect social security? If 
the robot breaks, does it get disability pay?”). 
 61 See I.R.C. § 183. 
 62 See id. § 179. 
 63 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (2019). 
 64 Mazur, supra note 1 (“But what is a ‘robot’ for these purposes, how do we 
measure how much income it generates, and what is the purpose of this line 
drawing?”). 
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engineers were both categorized for tax purposes as employees and 
working within the United States.65 Hemel writes, “[t]he claim that 
robots represent ‘capital’—more often asserted than explained—
turns out to be less obvious than it might appear initially. The cost 
of a robot is also—and is perhaps principally—the cost of the 
engineers and other highly skilled workers who design and produce 
the robot.”66 Hemel’s argument does not reflect the reality that most 
robots would typically be purchased as a capital asset from a third 
party manufacturer, and then placed in service by a company 
operating the robot as a capital asset, for purposes of both tax and 
book accounting.  
Nonetheless, some specialized robots are self-produced by the 
ultimate user of the robot where the labor to produce the robot could 
be taxed and then taken as translated into the machine under the 
novel accounting method proposed by Hemel. Even so, as a matter 
of both tax and book accounting, such costs are still capitalized into 
a capital asset and subject to depreciation or amortization as a matter 
of both tax and generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”); 
some portion of the costs might even be immediately expensed (or 
treated as repairs), which would yield an immediate expense and 
even greater tax advantage to capital. As was previously explained 
in the Abbott and Bogenschneider article, capital assets have an 
extended useful life; through immediate expensing of robot 
development costs, accelerated depreciation, or amortization of 
robot development, costs typically yield a much faster tax deduction 
than the alternative stream of future wages that would be paid to 
workers over the useful life of the robot.67 At the very least, it is 
axiomatic that robots are generally capital assets and properly 
identified as such under basic principles of tax law and accounting. 
Furthermore, any portion of intangible costs of automation or robot 
production, which is not capitalized and to which tax expensing 
might thereby be obtainable, yields an even greater tax advantage. 
 
                                                 
65 Hemel, supra note 18. 
 66 Id.  
67 Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 1. 
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d. Spillovers and Inability to Capture Benefits 
A few other responses to robot taxation were also given by 
Atkinson as: (i) loss of potential benefits of “spillover effects” from 
capital investment,68 and the argument that (ii) firms may be unable 
to capture the full benefits of capital investment.69 Spillover effects 
are often given as an argument in favor of the non-taxation of 
multinational firms. Perhaps the best evidence of spillover effects is 
the nation of Cuba, where by limiting foreign investment, 
technological advancement appears to have been inhibited. 
However, empirical evidence has also emerged that multinational 
firms “crowd out” domestic capital investment thereby creating a 
negative effect from foreign capital investment.70 For example, as 
Starbucks has moved into European markets, local coffee shops 
have died-off at least in part because small coffee shops are unable 
to engage in transfer pricing methods and are therefore subjected to 
                                                 
 68 Tyers & Zhou, supra note 4 (“There are interactions between nations, 
however. Spillovers from successful nations stem from their greater capital 
income, increased saving and lower real interest rates. In today’s integrated global 
financial market this raises investment and the capacity for innovation in other 
nations as well. The bulk of new investment is concentrated in the leader, 
however, with the medium run consequence that capital accumulation is faster 
there and, with reduced low-skill wages, its real exchange rate depreciates.”); see 
Atkinson, supra note 2, at 15. 
 69 Atkinson, supra note 2, at 16 (“There are a number of reasons why firms are 
unable to capture all the benefits from their investments in capital equipment. One 
is that investments in new machinery give workers knowledge about these new 
investments that they then disclose to their next employer, which is then 
incentivized to also invest in that same new machinery. Indeed, users of new 
equipment learn what modifications need to be made and then transfer this 
experience to other firms through a host of means, including interfirm labor 
movement, trade shows, and professional association meetings. In addition, some 
equipment, especially information technology, has network effects wherein the 
benefits to other firms from a firm adopting the technology are significant. As Hitt 
noted, ‘Firm level investments in communications technologies can create 
benefits for business partners. Alternatively, investments in information 
technologies can produce knowledge that can spill over between firms.’”). 
 70 See generally Koen De Backer and Leo Sleeuwaegen, Does Foreign Direct 
Investment Crowd Out Domestic Entrepreneurship, 22 REV. OF INDUS. ORG. 67 
(2003) (discussing the effect of foreign direct investment for domestic 
entrepreneurs). 
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effective tax rates on any profits several times higher than 
Starbucks.71 The truth is that small business owners are unable to 
compete with Starbucks given the tax system which heavily favors 
large corporations. The technical answer to Atkinson is that 
spillover effects from capital investment are indeed beneficial, but 
crowding out effects from capital investment such as tax policy are 
harmful to small businesses, and the optimal economic policy 
depends on the circumstances. The evidence so far indicates that the 
harmful effects of crowding out probably exceed the beneficial 
effects of spillovers at least some of the time. 
Atkinson also argues that multinational firms are unable to 
capture all the benefits of capital investment.72 The idea appears to 
be that multinational firms should not be taxed because there are 
social benefits to capital investment that accrue partly to other 
owners of capital. Another version of this argument has been 
championed by Richard Epstein, who argues that the taxation of 
property is immoral because it would tend to change the 
rank-ordering of persons as measured in wealth holdings; which 
reflects the Enlightenment era means of economic thinking where 
tax policy would be considered fair if it did not change the 
rank-ordering of persons in land or slave holdings.73 First, an 
appropriate answer to Atkinson is simply that capital is often able to 
capture some, if not nearly all, of the economic return arising from 
labor. Hence, the return on capital investment is actually too high 
because it captures the return that should have been allocated to 
workers, and that economic distortion is so large that questions like 
whether the tax system should be designed to better allow Microsoft 
to capture all the benefits of the Windows operating system later. 
                                                 
71 Richard Murphy, Starbucks Avoiding Tax has a Knock-on Effect on 
Homegrown Business, GUARDIAN (Oct. 16, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
commentisfree/2012/oct/16/starbucks-tax-british-business [https://perma.cc/9FGJ-
LWAH]. 
72 Atkinson, supra note 2, at 16 (“But when a firm buys new equipment or 
software, it is not likely to capture all the benefits because other firms are able to 
boost their own productivity as a result. This is one of the key economic rationales 
for preferential tax treatment of investing in equipment.”). 
 73 Richard A. Epstein, Taxation in a Lockean World, 4 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 49 
(1986). 
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Second, even if there are fairness concerns created between capital 
holders caused by taxation, those concerns are less important than 
the collective concern manifested by Warren Buffet’s hypothetical 
secretary that her effective tax rate is much higher than Buffet’s.74 
2. Response to Critics 
a. Failure to Acknowledge Possibility of Over-Investment 
In the specific context of robot taxation, various economists 
have proposed that in all cases robot workers are more efficient than 
human workers.75 But, supply and demand are presented in 
economic theory as a function of variables and not as a rule in favor 
of tax exemption for one factor taken to be mobile. Economic 
functions present relations between variables and are not intended 
to be rendered as an outright rule taken irrespective of the factual 
circumstances relative to supply and demand. To the contrary, it 
should be seen as at least possible that analyses of supply and 
demand functions could indicate an over-investment in robots or 
other types of automation in an economy. Since a broad consensus 
among tax and legal scholars now exists that the tax system does 
favor robots as a type of capital investment, it seems plausible to 
consider the possibility that an over-investment in robots and 
automation may have already occurred because of distortions 
created by the tax system.76  
                                                 
 74 But see Atkinson, supra note 2 (“In some studies, researchers have accepted 
this reality, but then go on to assume that the lion’s share of the savings is captured 
by ‘capital’ and little goes to labor, in the form of either higher wages or lower 
prices. In other words, these robot skeptics acknowledge that robots will boost 
productivity and overall economic output (GDP) will go up, but they then 
bizarrely predict workers’ share of this will drop so much their actual real incomes 
will fall. This is not only illogical, history suggests it is wrong.”). 
 75 Davenport, supra note 55 (“Why should we tax something that leads to 
productivity—something our economy desperately needs?”); see also Atkinson, 
supra note 2, at 15 (“In other words, tax distortions such as the R&D tax credit or 
accelerated depreciation for investments in new equipment lead to more growth 
because these investments are more productive than others and have significant 
positive externalities.”). 
 76 Mazur, supra note 1, at 277 (“Rather, advances in robotics and other forms 
of artificial intelligence merely exacerbate the issues already caused by a tax 
system that undertaxes capital income and overtaxes labor income.”).  
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b. Method of Accounting in Calculation of the Tax Base 
Capital does not remit much tax relative to human labor. Such is 
technically true even in nations with ostensibly high statutory tax 
rates, including the United States prior to the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 
of 2017, where the statutory corporate tax rate was reduced from 
35% to 21%.77 Tax practitioners observe merely that taxable income 
must be calculated as the first step under any system of income tax 
assessment. By determining taxable income in the first step, the 
magic of tax avoidance planning happens; hence, the statutory tax 
rate does not by itself determine the amount of tax to be paid. 
Economic theory addressed this concern as it always has in the 
context of tax policy—this is by the creation of a special accounting 
method for determining the amount of taxes deemed to have been 
paid by capital.78 Here, robots are taken as a type of capital. Since 
the special accounting method is not cash based and constitutes a 
hypothetical, under the hypothetical, the taxes of shareholders, 
corporate executives, or even workers, are treated as if they were 
paid by the respective capital, even if capital does not pay any of 
those taxes directly. Hence, economic theory implies that even if 
robots do not pay income taxes directly, the various other types of 
taxes or even the taxes of shareholders or human workers are treated 
as if those taxes were paid by robots. 
c. Objective of Tax Neutrality between Robots and Human Workers 
Within economic theory there is no efficiency subtraction from 
economic results due to worker taxation,79 but there is an efficiency 
                                                 
 77 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 § 965.  
 78 For a summary of accounting methods, see SALLY JONES, ET AL., 
PRINCIPLES OF TAXATION FOR BUSINESS AND INVESTMENT PLANNING 6.6-6.14 
(2020); see also BOGENSCHNEIDER, AMERICA, supra note 40. 
 79 Englisch, supra note 4, at 9 (“. . . justified as an equalisation levy? Contrary 
to what has been claimed in literature, taxing the use of robots as if they were 
human wage earners can also hardly be justified as a measure to restore a level 
playing field, i.e. on grounds of neutrality of taxation. Admittedly, the tax 
treatment of the two factors of production—capital and labour—differs, and so 
does, therefore, also the tax treatment of human workers and robots . . .”). But see 
McCredie et al., supra note 32, at 5 (“Alternate proposals that do not directly tax 
corporations due to fears of impeding or stagnating innovation include first, 
creating a tax neutral system which allows the market to choose the most efficient 
 
OCT. 2020] Will Robots Agree to Pay Taxes? 29 
 
subtraction for robot taxation. In other words, tax policy is presumed 
not to be symmetrical between human and robot workers. Because 
of this asymmetry between human and robot workers, it is possible 
to conclude that there would be no taxation of robots as a type of 
capital investment in the standard economic model as applied to 
taxation.80 In a nutshell, standard economic doctrine applied to the 
topic of robot taxation gives a complete logical defense for the 
exemption of robots, as a type of capital, from taxation, always, 
irrespective of the particular circumstances that may arise now or in 
the future. 
d. Detailed Tax Technical Analysis 
In a recently published conference proceeding from a 
symposium on artificial intelligence and the future of tax law, 
Hemel proposed a series of detailed responses to one of the initial 
papers on robot taxation by Abbott and Bogenschneider.81 Several 
of the positions taken by Hemel are summarized and addressed here 
as follows: 
(1) Substitution of robots for human workers does not yield 
any tax advantage; 
(2) Robots are comprised in significant part of intellectual 
property; 
                                                 
unit of production, a human or a robot. For example, the South Korean ‘robot tax’ 
which removed tax incentives for investments in automated machines.”).  
 80 For the identification of the philosophical question of symmetry in the 
context of robot taxation, see Arndts & Kappner, supra note 39, at 1–15 (“If 
humans and artificial intelligences are similar in some or even all of those 
dimensions then by symmetry humans and artificials [sic] intelligences should be 
taxed in a similar way. Taxes on humans should not be higher than taxes on 
robots.”). 
 81 Hemel, supra note 18. A few of Hemel’s assertions, including that (i) robots 
are not necessarily capital assets, and (ii) capital investments are not necessarily 
eligible for accelerated depreciation, will not be addressed any further here 
because it is axiomatic that for both tax and accounting purposes robots are treated 
as capital assets, and that tax depreciation is available for robot investment under 
the tax laws of most countries, which is accelerated relative to the useful life of 
the robot. Id. In some countries, such as the United States, accelerated 
depreciation is offered as a special tax incentive to encourage investment in 
capital assets, such as robots. 
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(3) The United States applies a hybrid income and 
consumption tax regime where capital is taxed 
elsewhere; and 
(4) Tax accounting practice which claims lawful tax 
deductions from capital investment is “gaming” by 
altering the baseline. 
First, substitution of robots for human workers does not yield 
any tax advantage. Hemel proposes a thought experiment where 
instead of a one-to-one trade-off of the substitution of a robot worker 
for a human worker, he suggests an owner could opt for a one-to-two 
trade-off where a firm with human workers could also make a capital 
investment to obtain the tax benefit afforded to capital while still 
employing the human workers.82 Hemel explains as follows: 
Abbott and Bogenschneider assume that the first option is tax-favored 
relative to the second in a regime with capital expensing . . . This turns 
out to be wrong, though. If capital investments can be deducted 
immediately, then the firm can write off the full $69,548.82 in year one 
either way. Either it will invest in the robot or it will use the $69,548.82 
to make another capital investment from which it will withdraw to pay 
wages in subsequent years.83 
This thought experiment can be illustrated with a diagram as 
follows: 
 
ABBOTT & BOGENSCHNEIDER 
 
  
                                                 
82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 232–33.  
 




First, the simple answer to Hemel is that the second option does 
not yield the best available tax result. If the investment into a 
depreciable capital asset was an item to be used in the business, such 
as machinery, to be added in addition to human workers, this would 
yield an increased output that, for purposes of this illustration, will 
be assumed to be roughly double. Under baseline assumptions, a 
firm could achieve a superior result to the second option provided 
by Hemel by substituting robots for humans on the top line as 
follows: 
DOUBLE ADVANTAGED TAX RESULT 
 
Second, if the capital investment is not an investment to be used 
in the business, then it is not depreciable for tax purposes, and does 
not yield any tax advantage on the second line, and in addition would 
result in taxable income to the firm (assuming the interest coming 
from the capital asset was taxable), thus creating an overall negative 
tax result as follows: 
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ERROR IN OMISSION OF TAXABLE INCOME 
 
Third, robots are comprised, in significant part, of intellectual 
property (“IP”). Here, Hemel suggests that robots incorporate IP 
developed by humans, so there is merely a trade off in wage 
remuneration from the production locale to Silicon Valley.84 By 
robots being comprised in part of IP, he is essentially positing the 
U.S. tax system as levying tax on a value-added basis where each 
activity is taxed based on its increase in respective value, as the 
value creator has simply shifted from one place to another and would 
still be taxable. He writes: 
The bulk of the robots’ value derives from the underlying intellectual 
property—IP that was developed, somewhere, by human engineers and 
other knowledge workers. Moe’s Tavern is, in effect, firing its human 
bartenders and replacing them with another fleet of human bartenders 
(who may be hundreds or thousands of miles away in an office building 
in Silicon Valley or along Massachusetts’s Route 128 corridor).85 
However, this idea is not a reasonable assumption for the 
formulation of tax policy for at least two reasons. First, the United 
States uses an income tax system and not a hybrid value-added tax 
system. Significantly, this means that the firm (or its engineers) who 
creates the IP or software for the robots will likely not generate 
taxable income equal to the sale price of the robot by its value in 
comparison to the end consumer of the robot, even if all of the 
production activity is unreasonably assumed to take place in the 
United States. This is because both the engineering firm and the firm 
employing the robot in lieu of the worker will include a margin in 
the price that will not be taxable currently due to other tax planning 
activity. Second, any income related to IP embedded in robots will 
                                                 
84 Id. at 233. 
 85 Id. at 233–34. 
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be shifted offshore (even if the workers sit in the United States), to 
the Cayman Islands for example, via transfer pricing and structuring 
using intangibles. Hence, it is a reasonable working assumption that 
only the portion of the profits not related to the IP would potentially 
be taxable in the United States, even under the laughable 
assumptions that the engineers were working in the United States 
and subject to taxation as workers. 
Further, the United States applies a hybrid income and 
consumption tax regime where capital is taxed elsewhere. Hemel 
suggests that corporate income is subject to double taxation where 
the shareholders are potentially subject to tax.86 However, since 
corporations often do not choose to pay taxable dividends, the 
second layer of tax posited by Hemel does not apply very often. 
Many corporations have recently chosen to buy back stock instead 
of paying dividends to stockholders, which does not yield a second 
layer of tax if the stockholders who sell in the buy-back hold the 
stock in a 401(k) or for other reasons are not subject to U.S. taxation. 
In addition, U.S. corporations have substantial offshore profits that 
have typically not been taxed in the United States; thus, a first layer 
of tax was never applied and firms were allowed to repatriate those 
accumulations at a reduced rate after the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 
2017.87 The respective tax statistics on capital taxation generally, or 
more aptly, the lack thereof, have been ably summarized in an article 
by Soled and Thomas.88 
Income categorized as wage income is generally not subject to 
reduction of the taxable base by and through transfer pricing, 
whereas income derived from capital, including especially income 
earned by large corporations, is subject to reduction by subtractions 
to the taxable base. Hence, the categorization of profits derived from 
robots as wage income means, in practical terms, that it will be 
subjected to tax, and its categorization as profit from capital income 
means that it may not be taxed at all, or at least not very much. Tax 
                                                 
 86 See id. at 236. 
 87 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 § 965 
(explaining the transition tax rate varies from 15.5% to 8% depending on the 
liquidity of the respective assets). 
 88 Soled & Thomas, supra note 1, at 7.  
 
34 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 22: 1 
avoidance by multinational firms is most often achieved by and 
through transfer pricing techniques where corporate taxes payable 
can be reduced by shifting income and expense between taxing 
jurisdictions, often to or near zero.89 The potential for tax avoidance 
by transfer pricing is often presumed amongst tax practitioners who 
have some practical experience in tax avoidance planning thus 
rendering economic analysis that does not take into account tax 
avoidance potentials by transfer pricing and other methods not very 
helpful to tax policy design.90 
Finally, Hemel essentially says that the use of tax accounting to 
lawfully claim tax deductions to reduce the tax base (i.e., to calculate 
taxable income) just is not fair because it changes the underlying 
economics by altering the baseline.91 The first part of Hemel’s claim 
is indeed true, but the latter is obviously not. Abbott and 
Bogenschneider were simply describing the tax system as it actually 
exists, not attempting to make an argument about optimal taxation 
under ideal economic assumptions. 
The many economic papers, such as Hemel’s, which describe an 
economic version of optimal taxation excluding the role of tax 
accounting, are not particularly helpful to tax policy formation since 
tax accounting is central to policy outcomes; it is hard to imagine a 
world without accounting toward tax avoidance even if that world 
were optimal.92 The process of maximizing tax deductions is to 
                                                 
 89 See, e.g., Stephen Gandel, Amazon Paid a Tax Rate of Just 1.2% Last Year, 
Versus 14% for Average Americans, CBS NEWS (Feb. 6, 2020, 3:24 PM), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/amazon-taxes-1-2-percent-13-billion-2019/ 
[https://perma.cc/R6PW-ZZ32]. 
 90 See, e.g., Jonathan Chew, Corporate Giants Accused of Evading Billions in 
Taxes, FORTUNE (Mar. 11, 2016, 11:00 AM), https://fortune.com/2016/03/11/ 
apple-google-taxes-eu/ [https://perma.cc/EX4M-JB9Y].  
 91 Hemel, supra note 18, at 221–22. 
 92 Joao Guerreiro, Sergio Rebelo & Pedro Teles, Should Robots Be Taxed? 1 
(Dynamic Econ. & Monetary Union, Working Paper No. 2017/085, 2018) (“We 
find that robot taxes are optimal only when there is partial automation. These taxes 
help increase the wages of routine workers, giving the government an additional 
instrument to reduce income inequality. Once there is full automation, it is not 
optimal to tax robots. Routine workers do not work, so taxing robots distorts 
production decisions without reducing income inequality.”); Arndts & Kappner, 
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create an economic distortion to alter the baseline;93 the creation of 
distortions where taxable income does not match to economic 
income is a significant part of practicing tax as a tax lawyer or tax 
accountant. The methods of tax accounting to maximize the value 
of tax deductions have been summarized on an analytic basis in 
several of the author’s prior articles in the Journal of Taxation of 
Investments;94 typically, the means to achieve distortion by tax 
planning include: (1) tax depreciation accelerated from real 
depreciation; (2) tax depreciation accelerated from book 
depreciation; (3) bunching; (4) shifting income offshore by transfer 
pricing; (5) claiming distortions intentionally granted by the tax 
code; (6) intentionally matching deductions to income; and 
(7) holding assets to avoid a realization or recognition event.  
III. REVISED FRAMEWORK FOR INTERNATIONAL TAX  
Modern economic theory favors the heavy taxation of human 
labor in all circumstances, even where labor is in short supply. 
Arnold Harberger created various analytics models of tax incidence, 
one of which is referred to as the “small open economy model,” to 
support this policy preference.95 One version of the model suggested 
                                                 
supra note 39, at 1–2 (“First, by reviewing the theoretical, empirical and 
normative literature on input factor taxation, we conclude that the optimal capital 
gains tax rate is close to zero under a reasonable set of assumptions.”). 
 93 Bottone, supra note 26, at 10. (“Traditionally, the optimal taxation of 
productive inputs depends upon the institutional capacity to offset theoretical 
criteria usually employed to evaluate a tax design: neutrality, efficiency and 
equity. But, actually, it also depends upon policy goals. As far as capital and 
labour are concerned, they are always taxed differently: the infringement of the 
principle of neutrality is justified mostly by the need to foster productive 
investments.”). 
 94 Bret N. Bogenschneider & Benjamin Walker, A Revised ETR Measure for 
Capital Re-Investment by Profitable Firms, 37 J. TAX’N INV. 33 (2020) 
[hereinafter Bogenschneider & Walker]; Bret N. Bogenschneider, The Tax 
Paradox of Capital Investment, 33 J. TAX’N INV. 59 (2015) [hereinafter 
Bogenschneider, Paradox]. 
95 Arnold C. Harberger, Taxation, Resource Allocation and Welfare in 1964 
THE ROLE OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT TAXES IN THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 
25, 42, http://www.nber.org/chapters/c1873.pdf [https://perma.cc/C87J-PFUG] 
[hereinafter Harberger, Taxation]; see Arnold C. Harberger, Efficiency Effects of 
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that labor should be taxed as it represents the less mobile factor of 
production.96 Harberger’s analytic models are problematic to tax 
policy because they are insufficient to establish that in all cases it 
makes sense to reduce supply of either factor of production by 
taxation. The insufficiencies are especially obvious where one factor 
of production is targeted for taxation, namely labor, but was already 
in short supply in a respective economy, such as in Japan, South 
Korea, Germany, or Switzerland, notably representing many of the 
countries most interested in robot tax policy.97 
Various economic scholars have criticized robot tax policy on 
the grounds of what is referred to as international tax competition 
based on Harberger’s modeling as described in the prior paragraph.98 
The basic idea is taken from “tax incidence” analysis and states that 
if any nation sets a robot tax, as South Korea has already done, this 
                                                 
Taxes on Income from Capital, in EFFECTS OF CORPORATION INCOME TAX, 107, 
114–17 (1966). 
 96 Harberger, Taxation, supra note 51. 
 97 Clausing, supra note 9, at 438–45 (expressing how large corporations behave 
as if they bear the incidence of taxation); Harberger, Taxation, supra note 51 
(discussing Harberger’s competing models of tax incidence are analytic models, 
reflecting deductive reasoning, but a choice between these models reflects 
inductive reasoning.) Inductive reasoning here implies non-epistemological 
methods at least not as traditional scientists understand that term. Id. Inductive 
choices are not epistemological for several reasons; here, because it is not known 
why economists seem to prefer Harberger’s small open economy model. Id. 
Notably, the inductive choices of models might also be ideologically driven, but 
not necessarily so, since given the lack of epistemology we are not really able to 
explain why economists prefer to select models that suggest all tax incidence is 
borne by labor. Id. 
 98 Atkinson, supra note 2, at 9 (“But as the Economic Policy Institute pointed 
out, this conclusion is based on a fundamentally flawed methodology. The reality 
is few if any organizations spend more on robots than they save in labor costs 
(unless they are using robots to boost quality). And those labor savings costs are 
not buried, but rather are spent—and that spending creates jobs. As Autor wrote: 
Automation does indeed substitute for labor—as it is typically intended to do. 
However, automation also complements labor, raises output in ways that lead to 
a higher demand for labor, and interacts with adjustments in labor supply. Even 
expert commentators tend to overstate the machine substitution for human labor 
and ignore the strong complementarities between automation and labor that 
increase productivity, raise earnings and augment demand for labor.”). 
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will spark a migration of robots out of that country given the 
disincentive effects of taxation of a mobile factor of production. 
Within the theory, only capital is taken as mobile, and labor is taken 
as not mobile, so economists propose that taxes should be levied on 
labor as the immobile factor of production. Some economists go 
further and say the outward migration of capital would be so large 
that it might even reduce the tax base creating a deadweight loss 
from capital taxation.99 
Robots are seen as a type of capital or equivalent to capital. 
Hence, under the standard economic theory described above, 
multinational firms might be expected to prefer to minimize taxes 
levied on capital including robots and migrate into jurisdictions with 
low taxes on robots. Atkinson explained as follows: 
There is another reason for a nation using the tax code to encourage 
investment: increased global competitiveness. In a relatively closed 
economy with little mobile capital, a highly effective corporate tax rate 
can have the effect of reducing overall investment but do little to affect 
the location of investment between nations. This situation essentially 
describes the U.S. economy until the late 1970s. But since then, 
competition for internationally mobile investment has significantly 
increased, spurred by reduced trade and capital barriers as well as 
technological innovations that enable global supply chains (e.g., 
shipping containers, software to manage logistics, etc.).100 
The tax policy mandates derived from Harberger’s analytics and 
incorporated into modern economic theory are, at the very least, 
surprising.101 The baseline rule of assigning the tax base entirely to 
                                                 
 99 See Feldstein, supra note 41. 
 100 Atkinson, supra note 2, at 17. 
 101 See Harberger, Taxation, supra note 95. It is also surprising that the same 
tax policy rule would apply for countries in different factual circumstances, even 
for countries in very different economic circumstances, such as in respect to labor 
supply or the availability of raw materials, such as say Finland and Mexico, or 
Brazil and Japan. The United States appears to be a large, open, economy and not 
a “small open economy,” or even a “large closed economy,” and thus, does not 
correspond to the analytic frameworks that Harberger proposed. In fact, Harberger 
did not provide an analytic framework for a large open economy, such as the 
United States. China might be seen as a possible candidate for application of 
Harberger’s “large closed economy” analytics. Yet, no attempts appear to have 
been made thus far by economic theorists to apply Harberger’s “large closed 
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labor applies in large countries with large, open economies and 
ready access to skilled and unskilled labor, such as the United States, 
and also to relatively smaller countries with less ready access to 
unskilled labor, such as Finland or even Austria, for example.102 
Furthermore, once placed in service, robot workers would seem to 
comprise possibly a fourth factor of production, as it appears 
distinguishable from the other factors of labor, capital, and land. 
Robots also appear to be, at least in some cases, less mobile than 
human workers, so relative mobility would suggest that robot 
workers representing a fourth factor of production should then be 
taxed under at least one if not all of Harberger’s competing models 
of tax incidence.  
Joachim Englisch set out the issue as a matter of economic 
theory in Conference Proceedings at Luxembourg University, where 
he wrote: “[h]owever, [accounting practice] . . . contradicts textbook 
economic theory according to which only a comprehensive 
cash-flow taxation is fully neutral with respect to investment 
projects. Where tax accounting requires asset capitalisation and 
pro-rata depreciation, it distorts marginal investment decisions.”103 
But, the methods of accounting do exist in the actual world. So, as 
Englisch correctly says, the process of tax accounting “distorts 
marginal investment decisions” from the non-existent economic 
theory of comprehensive cash-flows analyses.104 The “distortion of 
income,” as Englisch describes, is not sufficiently reflected within 
                                                 
economy” model to tax policy in China, which would otherwise suggest the 
taxation of capital, as opposed to labor, might be efficient at least in that context. 
Also surprising is that a nominally “small open economy,” such as Switzerland, 
has by its methods of direct democracy essentially reversed economic thinking on 
tax policy by levying relatively low taxes on wages, and flat rate taxes on wealth, 
but currently enjoys arguably the highest standard of living in the world. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Englisch, supra note 4, at 11. 
 104 Id. For a market failure analysis of robot taxation see Ooi & Goh, supra note 
15, at 1–2 (“Thus, an ‘automation tax’ is required to correct this market failure. 
The aims of an automation tax are two-pronged: first, to slow the introduction of 
automation technology in industries which would otherwise suffer rapid and 
massive unemployment otherwise, so as to provide as much time as possible for 
governments, welfare systems, and workers to prepare for the impending effects 
of structural unemployment; second, to impose a tax on companies that automate 
so as to generate revenue for the support and re-skilling of displaced workers.”). 
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economy theory, which is instead focused on the rate of return on 
marginal capital investment. Since accounting exists in the world, 
there is a need to take its distorting effects into account in 
formulating tax policy. 
A.  Tax Deductions for Capital Reinvestment  
Tax investment appears to flow into higher tax jurisdictions and 
not away from higher tax jurisdictions in nearly all cases. The 
foremost question for international tax policy is why this happens. 
Tax deductions including depreciation arising from capital 
investment, such as investments in robots or other forms of 
automation, are worth more in high tax jurisdictions, at least to those 
firms already turning a profit in high tax jurisdictions. That caveat 
holds for profitable multinational firms much of the time. In 
comparison, tax deductions for capital investment are worth nothing 
in tax havens, such as those tax havens in the Caribbean where the 
tax rate is set at zero percent (0%).105 Accordingly, it is unlikely that 
any profitable firm would choose to set up robots or other automated 
factories in a tax haven and there is little evidence that any have 
chosen to do so. That conclusion follows because as a matter of tax 
accounting it is necessary to calculate a tax base and not merely to 
compare statutory tax rates in order to calculate an amount of tax 
payable. 
The requisite calculation of a tax base is a type of tax practitioner 
knowledge where the tax base is often referred to in tax parlance as 
“taxable income,” meaning income after subtractions that are 
creatures of the tax code. The accounting creatures that are created 
do not necessarily match to real economic values. In the real 
economy, the incentive effects of tax deductions to capital 
re-investment within income tax systems are of crucial significance. 
By applying such practical accounting and legal knowledge of tax 
methods, it can be explained why most economic growth occurs in 
high tax jurisdictions, such as California, New York, London, 
                                                 
 105 See generally Koffie Ben Nassar, Corporate Income Tax Competition in 
the Caribbean 6 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper WP/08/77, 2008) 
(referencing the Caribbean tax rates set at zero). 
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Beijing, Frankfurt, New Delhi, and so on. Economic growth does 
not seem to occur disproportionately in the many tax havens within 
and around the Caribbean or Mediterranean Seas, where the 
standard of living is often stagnant notwithstanding the respective 
tax rates set at or near zero.106 There is also strong anecdotal 
evidence that capitalism functions poorly in countries with insidious 
corruption, exactly because it defeats the built-in incentive of 
business owners to re-invest profits back into profitable 
businesses.107  
In practical terms, the ability to use deductions to reduce the 
taxable base means that taxes are not the deciding factor in 
investment decisions and explains why businesses often choose to 
invest in high-tax jurisdictions. This concept was previously 
developed with the following illustration: 
Active Investment: “Active Investor” invests $100,000 in a dry cleaning 
business, which he owns and operates in New York City (a high-tax 
jurisdiction). In the first year, the store generates $55,000 in revenue of 
which $5,000 is profit for book and tax purposes. [Active Investor] thus 
pays tax on $5,000, although he received cash proceeds of over $50,000. 
[Active Investor] automatically received tax deductions on capital 
outlays for one-half of the investment in the first year. If the store does 
well, [Active Investor] may open a second dry-cleaning business in the 
subsequent year, which will generate additional depreciation deductions 
for tax purposes. This will further reduce [Active Investor]’s “taxable 
income” in the subsequent years. Accordingly, the high tax rate is not 
the decisive factor in the decision whether to open the dry-cleaning 
business in New York City. To the contrary, the store owner is concerned 
almost exclusively with whether the store will constitute a good and 
profitable business.108 
Practicing tax accountants and lawyers may apply a theory of 
taxation that differs from what economists have proposed. In tax 
practice, the value of tax deductions is carefully considered in tax 
planning activity, in addition to the maximization of the marginal 
return on investment, which is foremost in economic theory. The 
difference between tax practice and economic theory appears to 
broadly explain the human preference for income tax systems in 
                                                 
 106 Id.  
 107 Id.  
 108 Bogenschneider, Paradox, supra note 94, at 61. 
OCT. 2020] Will Robots Agree to Pay Taxes? 41 
 
comparison to other tax types. Therefore, there is now an 
explanation of the why as promised above. The concepts were 
explained by Bogenschneider in the tax technical literature as well: 
Prior measures of Effective Tax Rates (ETR) were largely premised on 
the idea that taxes reduce the economic return on capital investment . . . 
taxes may reduce a future economic return. However, this approach is 
not realistic in all cases. For example, a multinational firm might also 
decide to re-invest profits into a jurisdiction where it is already profitable 
and where that capital investment yields a present tax deduction (or 
alternatively, a series of tax deductions into the future) that has a present 
value. Under such conditions (i.e., current profitability and current 
income taxation), a firm might decide to undertake capital re-investment 
to obtain a tax deduction using available surplus cash. And this type of 
tax-motivated investment may have the effect of reducing current 
income taxation as a matter of both book and tax accounting, currently 
and for future periods.109 
At least one iteration of Harberger’s tax incidence “models” 
predicts that capital investment should migrate into tax havens.110 
However, such a migration rarely, or never, actually happens in real 
life. Practically, this model is not very helpful due to the lack of 
predictive force. The inductive choice of a “model” where 
Harberger’s analysis suggests that capital should be expected to 
migrate into tax havens in search of low tax rates appears to be 
categorically mistaken.111 Furthermore, it can be said that the 
inductive feelings by which economists have selected that particular 
version of Harberger’s “model” were wrong, and those inductive 
feelings will need to be updated. Since business profits are netted 
against expenses including depreciation on capital assets, mobile 
capital remains largely within high-tax jurisdictions. This netting 
process creates a value for tax deductions arising from capital 
reinvestment into ongoing business pursuits as a means of tax 
planning. Thus, the income tax system creates a strong and 
automatic incentive for profitable businesses to reinvest profits back 
into the economy. Although ergodic shifts in taxpayer preferences 
are entirely possible in the future due to technological change or 
other factors, there is every reason to believe that advanced and 
                                                 
109 Bogenschneider & Walker, supra note 94, at 34. 
110 Bogenschneider, Paradox, supra note 94, at 61. 
111 Id. 
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well-informed AIs would prefer that policymakers act in the mutual 
interest in setting tax policy based on the available evidence. 
From this revised version of international taxation, it is possible 
then to begin to formulate possible AI preferences under various tax 
policy scenarios. An advanced AI is likely to prefer a tax system 
which maintains its ability to obtain tax deductions for incremental 
capital investment. Such is illustrated in the following summary 
table: 
 
Summary Table of Robot Tax Proposals with Base AI Preference 
Type AI Avoidability 
1. Automation Tax similar to UI 
X 
Disfavored, lacks income tax 
incentives 
2. Imputation of Hypothetical 
Salary 
X 
Disfavored, eliminates deferral to 
robots 
3. Disallowance of Tax 
Deductions 
X 
Disfavored, cancels income tax 
incentives 
4. VAT on Robot Activities  
X 
Disfavored, lacks income tax 
incentives 




6. Grant of Offsetting Tax 
Preferences 
 
Favored, only if shifts revenue 
base to borrowing  
7. Corporate Self-Employment 
Tax 
X 
Disfavored, eliminates special 
treatment of robots 
8. Negative Depreciation on 
Robots 
X 
Disfavored, discriminates against 
robots 
9. Automation Fee 
X 
Disfavored, lacks income tax 
incentives 
10. Tradeable Permits  
Favored, creates artificial 
incentive framework 
11. Increase in Corporate Tax 
Rate 
 
Favored, incentives capital 
reinvestment 
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B. Likely AI Preference for Income Taxation at High Rates 
By applying a baseline approach based on accounting methods 
with an incentive value assigned to tax deductions, it seems 
reasonable to believe that advanced AIs should be expected to 
voluntarily agree to remit taxes, just as most humans voluntarily 
agree to remit taxes under the tax system as it is designed today. 
And, the argument is not merely that if humans create robots in our 
own image, then robots should be expected to adopt the preferences 
or social norms of their creators. Rather, the idea here is a tax 
technical assertion that income tax systems are inherently more 
efficient than other tax types because of the calculation of a tax base 
which may be reduced by capital reinvestment. Advanced AIs will 
be able to formally prove to themselves, or perhaps their masters, 
depending on how one views the future evolution of AIs, the 
importance of tax accounting to economic results; and therefore, 
advanced AIs will conclude by tax “actualing” that income tax 
systems are inherently efficient and set out to levy income taxes at 
high rates since that design encourages capital reinvestment by 
profitable firms. 
If AIs are equally smart, or perhaps ultimately even smarter than 
humans, it seems reasonable to think that such an advanced 
intelligence may find a means to avoid taxes, just as smart humans 
are now often able to find ways around taxes. Since the tax system 
is currently designed to heavily tax labor as opposed to capital, it is 
at least possible that advanced intelligences might design the tax 
system to favor human labor over capital if human labor became in 
greater demand in a world comprised partly of advanced AIs. There 
is then the question of whether advanced AIs might define human 
workers as merely equivalent to a type of robot suitable to some 
specific types of projects, including manual labor of various sorts, 
such as plumbing.112 Perhaps the presumptions of prior research that 
                                                 
 112 Estlund, Automation, supra note 1, at 313 (“The problem, as economists 
across the political spectrum agree, is that wage hikes of that magnitude are very 
likely to destroy jobs and displace workers. Those wage-destructive tendencies 
are magnified as robots and algorithms become ever-better and cheaper substitutes 
for human workers, especially in the routine tasks that dominate many low-wage 
jobs.”); Erdoğdu & Karaca, supra note 42, at 118 (“Nevertheless, it is expected 
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the so-called “routine” work will be replaced by automation is 
erroneous, and AIs will find that they are best suited to tasks such 
as capital management and stock trading—perhaps “non-routine” 
jobs are most at risk of automation.113 The question may be not what 
jobs humans currently think are important and should be rewarded 
with high pay, but what jobs humans might be able to do that 
advanced AIs would find difficult or undesirable to do. 
Tax policy premised on ideology will be significantly 
undermined once an advanced AI develops the ability to engage in 
what might be described as: tax actualing, a corollary of “deep 
learning.”114 The term refers to predicting economic behaviors based 
on actual data and cash flows in the economy.115 Tax actualing is to 
be contrasted with economic modeling which is the notoriously 
inaccurate method of predicting matters in taxation. In the near 
future, as the availability of data increases exponentially,116 it seems 
                                                 
that demand for specific groups of professions will decrease rapidly as a result of 
advances in AI and robotics.”). 
 113 See generally Dana Darja Øye, The Robots are Already Here: An Empirical 
Assessment of Automation and Changes in the Occupational Composition of the 
Norwegian Labour Market 5 (May 2018) (M.Ec. thesis, University of Oslo) (on 
file with the University of Oslo) (“These studies show growing employment in 
professional, managerial and personal service occupations, and declining 
employment in manufacturing and other routine jobs.”). 
 114 Sampath, supra note 21, at 11 (“Deep learning from large data sets—ranging 
from Instagram images, emails, voice recordings, online posts and so on—have 
made possible the creation of recent image and voice recognition software, while 
other forms of AI applications employed for decision-making in education, 
employment, insurance and health care, are often a combination of Baysian 
hypothesis and deep learning methods.”). 
 115 Ooi & Goh, supra note 15, at 3 (“Algorithms have become dramatically 
better at identifying patterns and making judgments due to the greater availability 
of the data used as raw material for these algorithms, as well as an increase in 
processing power that has made it possible to process and interpret the vast 
quantity of available data. Algorithms are used in artificial intelligence 
programmes, which, due to their inherent speed, reliability, and scalability, now 
possess an advantage over humans in areas such as securities trading.”) (citations 
omitted). 
 116 Sampath, supra note 21, at 11 (“While data is in fact nonexcludable and 
non-exhaustive, there is little basis to use the classical economic argument that a 
property right on data is required to enable its production because data is being 
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reasonable to think that advanced AI will have the ability to track 
actual cash flows through the actual economy, where the economy 
is comprised of many billions of persons and other economic actors, 
including entities such as corporations or other legal entities. 
Available data will then be supplemented with some external causal 
hypotheses to thereby predict with precision what the economic 
outcome will be from a tax levy or tax proposal.117 Any prediction 
by an advanced AI will be based on how those billions of actors are 
expected to behave in response to the new tax policy based on data 
such as savings rates and spending behaviors reflecting a partly 
scientific and partly “deep learning” method.118 Thus far, the ability 
of AI to understand and predict human behavior based on online 
posts has proven problematic,119 but in the tax context at least, the 
potential for AI to soon reach useful conclusions seems imminent. 
An advanced AI with sufficient knowledge of economic variables 
should soon be able to predict how all of the dollars and cents would 
                                                 
generated both actively and passively by users, in quantities that are increasing 
exponentially each day based solely on the numbers of people who use such 
products/services.”). 
 117 See generally Ene, supra note 15, at 51 (“The list continues, with algorithms 
that can help machines interpret and apply coherently this bottomless resource of 
data, aiming to create autonomous metallic entities that can do everything humans 
can do, but better. If one wishes to compete with such serious opponents, it would 
have to resort to technologically infused human enhancements, or capitulate.”). 
 118 See KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 1, 90 (2nd ed. 
2002) (“[T]he theoretician must long before [experimentation] have done his 
work, or at least what is the most important part of his work: he must have 
formulated his question as sharply as possible. Thus it is he who shows the 
experimenter the way. But even the experimenter is not in the main engaged in 
making exact observations; his work, too, is largely of a theoretical kind. Theory 
dominates the experimental work from its initial planning up to the finishing 
touches in the laboratory.”). 
 119 Sampath, supra note 21, at 12 (“Or AI, while being good at execution and 
meeting targets, is limited in its ability to consider consequences and factor them 
into decision making. These shortcomings explain the accidental failures arising 
from AI applications which prioritize targets over potential consequences. For 
instance, in the area of energy, AI applications programed to optimize energy use 
have been found to simply cut off energy access to parts of the grid in situations 
of overload.”). 
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accrue to all the economic actors in the actual economy.120 Peter 
Bloom describes this possible phenomenon as a part of what is 
referred to as “Industry 4.0[, which] . . . focus[es] on the ability to 
mine explicit and implicit human data to allow machines to derive 
real time and long term ‘smart’ decision making.”121 
Notably, any discussion of what an advanced AI could do with 
respect to tax policy might only be thought of as reflecting the 
normative views of the author; this critique is something like a 
Rortyan mirror critique of epistemology generally,122 where any 
                                                 
 120 In comparison, econometric modeling has applied concepts such as 
“Deadweight Loss” to predict taxpayer behavior in broad statistical terms, 
however none of the predictions derived from these methods have really ever 
turned out to be accurate or replicable. See Richard G. Anderson & William G. 
Dewald, Replication and Scientific Standards in Applied Economics A Decade 
After the Journal of Money, Credit and Banking Project, 76 FED. RSRV. BANK OF 
ST. LOUIS REV. 79, 81 (1994). The inability to predict the results of a respective 
change in tax policy using economic theory leaves a wide latitude for one-armed 
economists as President Harry Truman once said, moral philosophers of all 
persuasions and beliefs, institutional think tanks, internet charlatans and other 
laypersons, politicians, and others, to render tax policy recommendations on 
various ideological grounds without any real idea of the likely outcome of their 
ideas on tax policy, just as Eisenstein said. Compare Maik Hettinger & Jonathan 
Andrew Boyd, Taxation of robots – What Would Have Been the View of Smith 
and Marx on it?, 47 INT’L J. SOC. ECON. 41 (2020) with David Elkins, 
Consumption Taxation in Rawls’ Theory of Justice, 29 CORNELL J. LAW & PUB. 
POL’Y (forthcoming 2019) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
3359541 [https://perma.cc/Y3FW-MF3H]. 
 121 Peter Bloom, Creating Smart Economies: Administrating Empowering 
Futures, in IDENTITY, INSTITUTIONS AND GOVERNANCE IN AN AI WORLD 131 
(2020). 
 122 RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979); see 
also Bret N. Bogenschneider, A Philosophy Toolkit for Tax Lawyers, 50 AKRON 
L. REV. 451, 458 (2017) [hereinafter Bogenshneider, A Philosophy] (“Richard 
Rorty[‘s] . . . general objection to language-as-’tool[]’ . . . would be along the 
lines of the following: It is actually impossible for you to give these categories of 
philosophy potentially relevant to taxation in anything other than language, and 
when you propose to use these categories as a tool, that just reflects on you.”). 
But see Jürgen Habermas, Richard Rorty’s Pragmatic Turn, in RORTY AND HIS 
CRITICS 31, 49 (Robert Brandom, ed., 2000) (“Rorty would certainly not deny the 
connection between rational discourse and action. He would also agree with 
establishing a connection between the two perspectives: the perspective of the 
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purported system of knowing simply reflects back on the author, 
much like a mirror. In philosophical terms, the Rortyan critique 
rejects any epistemology of taxation apart from economics, such that 
all views must be considered normative—especially those which are 
not some derivation of economics.123 Various economic scholars see 
the initial paper by Abbott and Bogenschneider daring to suggest the 
concept of tax neutrality, as between human and robot workers, as 
the epitome of such normativity.124 
For this Article, which sets out to describe possible AI 
preferences on taxation, it is necessary to provide a response to the 
Rortyan critique in the prior paragraph. That response is as follows: 
since economic theory begins with the conclusion that human 
workers should bear as much of the tax base as possible,125 
alternative tax policy proposals are no more normative than 
economics itself, and some may be based on an alternative 
epistemology that could be even less normative than economics. The 
                                                 
participants in argumentation who seek to convince each other of the correctness 
of their interpretations, and the perspective of acting subjects involved in their 
language games and practices. However, . . . he borrows from the perspective of 
participants in argumentation the imprisonment in dialogue that prevents us from 
breaking free from contexts of justification; at the same time, he borrows from the 
perspective of actors the mode of coping with the world.”). 
 123 See RORTY, supra note 122. 
 124 Englisch, supra note 4, at 12 (“Consequently, accelerated depreciation 
beyond the actual use of the robot is assumed to yield tax benefits over alternative 
investments and factors of production, including the wage payments for the ‘use’ 
of human workers. However, they provide no empirical evidence for their 
claim.”). To the contrary, in tax policy, analysis, and scholarship, corporate 
taxpayers are presumed to claim tax deductions and incentives where available; 
hence, evidence for tax benefits for capital investment is presented with citation 
to the legal and accounting requirements, which allow for tax deductions, such as 
I.R.C. § 162. The Internal Revenue Service occasionally publishes data on 
individual taxpayers not filing or claiming eligible incentives where some 
non-filing occurs from death or incarceration not tracked by the federal 
government. However, to the knowledge of the author, no illustration of corporate 
taxpayers not claiming available tax deductions or incentives has ever been 
identified, so it is unlikely that any empirical study, such as that contemplated by 
Englisch, would be undertaken or published if it were to be undertaken. 
 125 Arndts & Kappner, supra note 39, at 17 (“Economists and members of the 
wider public advocate the taxation of human output.”). 
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abductive reasoning of tax practitioners is a possible epistemology 
in the tax context, just as the scientific method is an illustration of a 
type of epistemology in other contexts. Abductive reasoning 
represents a radically different epistemology than economics when 
applied to tax policy (as this Article illustrates), so the methods 
applied within it will be necessarily different than those to which 
legal scholars steeped in law and economics are accustomed. 
C. Robot Tax Proceeds for Universal Basic Income 
A line of research exists within robot tax literature representing 
a general push toward inequality reduction by a universal basic 
income (“UBI”) to be financed by a robot tax.126 The problem with 
the discussion of a robot tax as a means to fund UBI is that it is a 
type of earmarking of tax proceeds.127 In a few other contexts, social 
scientists have similarly proposed earmarking of the proceeds of 
                                                 
 126 Bendel, supra note 1, at 1 (“Basic income (also ‘unconditional basic income’ 
or ‘universal basic income’) and robot tax are often referred to as solutions to 
economic and social problems. In Germany, Scandinavia, India and other 
countries, the idea that every inhabitant be automatically provided with basic 
supplies is eagerly and vigorously supported, and fought against.”) (citing LOUISE 
HAAGH, THE CASE FOR UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME (2018)); Sampath, supra note 
21, at 20 (“Determining taxation of robotic production will be crucial, failing 
which states can find themselves in a situation of having to dole out universal 
basic income or other social protection benefits to individuals in the face of 
unemployment while large companies amass greater profits, enjoy greater 
efficiency and production surpluses without paying taxes on employee (robotic) 
revenues.”). 
 127 Estlund, Ideas, supra note 44, at 17 (“I believe that individuals, 
communities, and the society will be stronger and healthier if work (albeit perhaps 
less of it) is presumptively central to most people’s economic livelihoods. Both 
by inducing some individuals to drop out of the workforce and by soaking up 
social resources that might otherwise go into job creation, a UBI is likely to 
contribute to long term disengagement from the paid workforce, and the attendant 
social alienation and anomie that would entail, for some significant share of the 
beneficiaries. But there is a bit more to say about the pro-work objection to the 
UBI.”); see Erdoğdu & Karaca, supra note 42, at 118 (“A possible solution to this 
problem appears as levying a tax on robots to create tax revenue and address the 
social problems caused by extreme unemployment due to the automation. The 
revenue that may be generated here may also be reframed to remedy income 
inequality induced by robotisation.”). 
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new tax types toward social engineering directly related to the new 
tax levy.128 For example, in the context of sugar-sweetened beverage 
taxes, scholars proposed to use the proceeds of the sugar tax for 
re-education programs for consumers of sugar-sweetened 
beverages.129 The consumer re-education programs plus the 
disincentive effects of the tax levy itself, taken together, were then 
posited to achieve the social policy objectives of reducing sugar 
consumption.130  
Thus, in order to even begin tax policy analysis, social scientists 
question whether newly proposed tax levies ought to be earmarked 
directly to the social problem to which they most closely relate, 
rather than being paid into a general fund. In the specific context of 
robot taxation, the social problem of concern is obviously that many 
low-skilled or “routine” job types may be eliminated by 
automation,131 resulting in widespread unemployment, particularly 
                                                 
 128 See, e.g., Kelly D. Brownell et al., The Public Health and Economic Benefits 
of Taxing Sugar-Sweetened Beverages, 361 N. ENG. J. MED. 1599, 1599 (2009) 
(proposing earmarking tax proceeds to address societal concerns of obesity and 
other adverse health outcomes from consuming sugar-sweetened beverages). 
129 See, e.g., id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: UNITED STATES: KEY RESEARCH FINDINGS 11 
(Douglas Sutherland ed., 2019); see OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: UNITED STATES 
2018 52 (2019) http://www.oecd.org/economy/surveys/Overview-United-States-
2018-OECD.pdf [https://perma.cc/N39P-SC35] (“In a model with ‘routine’ 
workers, who are at risk of being replaced by robots, and ‘non-routine’ workers, 
who are not, a fall in the price of robots will raise tax revenue. As such, concerns 
about tax erosion appear misplaced.”); BOTTONE, supra note 26, at 13 (“As far as 
the taxation system is concerned, the substitution of workers with robots raises 
the issue of a possible loss of tax revenue as labour taxes are its major source. If 
low-skilled or routine workers are displaced by robots and policy makers do not 
make investments for retraining them, then unemployment raises and tax revenue 
coming from labour income falls, even if robot prices reduces.”). But see Sergio 
Paba & Giovanni Solinas, In Favour of Machines (But Not Forgetting the 
Workers): Some Considerations on the Fourth Industrial Revolution, in WORKING 
IN DIGITAL AND SMART ORGANIZATIONS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE DIGITALIZATION OF LABOUR 
RELATIONS 39, at 51 (Edoardo Ales et al. eds., 2018) (“Second, robots and AI can 
be complementary to labour (‘co-bots’) and can contribute to better working 
conditions. By replacing many repetitive and dangerous tasks, they contribute to 
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amongst unskilled workers.132 Tax proceeds from robot taxation 
could then be earmarked to directly address the problem of structural 
unemployment.133 Notably, a proverbial host of other academic 
scholars and paid-researchers vociferously dispute the underlying 
premise that such a social problem now exists, might someday exist, 
or that it should even be addressed by and through the tax system.134 
However, in nearly all other prior contexts of tax policy, 
incentive effects of taxation are not combined with social effects of 
full earmarking of tax proceeds to formulate tax policy.135 Tax policy 
proposals are more typically debated under the presumption that 
proceeds of the new tax will go into the general coffers and must be 
justified on that basis alone. The special earmarking for new tax 
                                                 
increase the demand for more skilled workers, increasing the opportunities for 
re-training and professional advancement.”). 
 132 Guerreiro et al., supra note 92, at 2 (“As the cost of automation falls, the 
wages of non-routine workers rise while the wages of routine workers fall to make 
them competitive with robot use. The result is a large rise in income inequality 
and a substantial decline in the welfare of routine workers.”); see also Øye, supra 
note 109, at 5 (“These authors argue that computer capital substitutes for workers 
in performing cognitive and manual tasks that can be accomplished by following 
explicit rules, and complements workers in performing non-routine 
problem-solving and complex communication tasks. They explain that the effect 
of technological progress is to replace routine labor which tends to be clerical and 
craft jobs in the middle of the wage distribution.”) (citing David Autor, Frank 
Levy & Richard Murnane, The Skill Content of Recent Technological Change: An 
Empirical Exploration, 118 Q. J. OF ECON. 1279 (2003); David Autor & David 
Dorn, The Growth of Low-Skill Service Jobs and the Polarization of the US Labor 
Market, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 1553 (2013)). 
 133 Estlund, Ideas, supra note 44, at 11 (discussing universal basic income and 
the perils of decentering ork). 
 134 See D’Orlando, supra note 10, at 5 (“[W]hat are the economic conditions 
that can lead to the substitution of (almost) all workers with machines? In 
addition, what can we do to face the problems caused by this substitution of the 
workforce?”); Paba & Solinas, supra note 131, at 43 (“The reduction in 
manufacturing employment is a long-standing feature of advanced economies. In 
the last 15 years (2000–2015), the US lost 28.6% of employment in 
manufacturing, Europe (15 countries) 18.6% and Japan 14.2%. Clearly, robots 
and automation are only some of the factors that can explain this decline.”) 
(citations omitted). 
 135 An exception is the excise taxation of gasoline where proceeds of state 
taxation of gasoline are earmarked.  
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types would seem to be desirable only in the situations where (i) all 
other tax levies and expenditures were allocated in a presumptively 
efficient manner, or (ii) the earmarking was for a matter of public 
necessity, such as the repair of roads or bridges. In that latter case of 
necessity, the earmarking could simply substitute dollar-for-dollar 
for other expenditures the government is obliged to make anyway 
making it roughly equivalent to funds added into the general coffers. 
Here in the United States, the federal government spends about 
$6.25 on the elderly for every $1 it spends on children,136 so there is 
no real danger of social programs reaching a high degree of 
efficiency, since money is not spent on those persons likely to 
generate a positive return for society in the future. A much greater 
return on investment could be obtained by earmarking tax receipts 
for child healthcare or early childhood education in comparison to 
UBI. Therefore, robot tax proposals should not be debated on the 
grounds of some special benefit resulting from earmarking the 
proceeds into UBI. Instead, the ongoing tax policy discourse on 
“robot taxation” is best thought of as primarily a matter of fiscal 
policy, since it represents foremost a debate over tax policy 
alternatives, not the desirability of UBI as social policy. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Advanced AIs will inevitably have some choice in the matter of 
tax policy. Advanced AIs should be expected to prefer (or even to 
voluntarily elect into) an income tax system levied at high rates. 
Since higher income tax rates are strongly associated with rapid 
economic growth in nearly all human societies—past, present, and 
by all indications, future—it is likely that AIs will voluntarily 
choose to assess income taxes upon themselves at high rates as a 
means to encourage capital reinvestment. However, the concept of 
voluntary choice will only be true under the broad assumption that 
the income tax will be applied to other economic actors in a neutral 
                                                 
 136 URB. INST., KIDS’ SHARE 2020: REPORT ON FEDERAL EXPENDITURES ON 
CHILDREN THROUGH 2019 AND FUTURE PROJECTIONS 3 (2020), 
https://www.urban.org/research/publication/kids-share-2020-report-federal-
expenditures-children-through-2019-and-future-projections/view/full_report 
[https://perma.cc/DH6T-WEJU] (noting that $408 billion was spent on children 
in 2019, representing roughly 9% of Federal outlays and 1.9% of GDP).  
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fashion as comprising some future society, including both humans 
and other intelligences. 
Nearly all human societies have flourished under an income tax 
system as opposed to other methods of taxation. The preference for 
the income tax system relates to the efficiency incentives of income 
taxation contained within it. Such a system would allow advanced 
AIs to achieve more economic output, even after subtracting the 
taxes that would be paid, just as has been the case with past human 
societies. And although this conclusion may seem obvious to most 
tax experts, such as practicing tax lawyers and accountants, it is 
nonetheless directly contrary to neoclassic economic theory 
predictions, thus many non-tax scholars may find it counterintuitive. 
Humans have formulated tax policy largely by means of moral 
philosophy and conjecture based on economic theory, reflecting an 
inductive process of reasoning manifested in selecting from various 
economic “models” with a desirable outcome. Little or no attempt 
has traditionally been made to determine whether these economic 
models correspond to “actual.” So, for example, economists do not 
ask if large corporations tend to make capital investments in Panama 
City, as their models would predict, or New York City, as 
experience would predict. If the economic models do not correspond 
to actual accounting practices, then they cannot be considered 
accurate predictors. 
Well-informed AIs seem poised to supersede economic 
“modeling” of tax matters with tax “actualing” by tracking cash 
flows through the actual economy and measuring the resulting tax 
impacts. The economic effects of tax remittance by each individual 
person or company will be known to an advanced AI with sufficient 
data. In the beginning, the process of “actualing” will be further 
supplemented with causal modeling as it relates to tax policy; 
however, the end result may be an incrementally better and more 
efficient tax policy. AIs will, on the other hand, have the ability to 
make accurate predictions on economic and tax matters, and 
probably very soon; this advancement will constitute a tectonic shift 
in the design of tax policy. A sufficiently advanced and 
well-informed AI may soon be able to give exactly what Harry 
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Truman requested roughly seventy years ago:137 a two-handed 
economic analysis of tax policy. 
Once tax experts are able to speak with actual knowledge of the 
results of various tax policy proposals, Eisenstein’s age of tax 
ideology will thereby end. Tax policy will of course still be 
controversial in the age of tax actualing, but it will become radically 
more advanced in terms of its policy recommendations. Tax 
actualing will allow the comparison of the costs and benefits of 
various tax policy proposals understood today as largely 
non-ideological grounds, and for the first time in human history. Of 
course, there will still be political ideology in that future era, but it 
will be markedly reduced from tax ideology as currently understood 
it today. For example, future tax policy debates might entail seeking 
out real Pareto Optimal results,138 or perhaps analyzing trade-offs 
where one party was made worse off and another was made better 
off to some degree, and whether that trade-off was a good or bad tax 
policy idea. Tax actualing offers policymakers the possibility of 
performing that analysis in an incrementally better manner than the 
present day where humans sometimes proceed with moral 
frameworks;139 some methods of moral philosophy (such as 
                                                 
 137 Herbert Stein, How to Introduce an Economist, in ON THE THIRD HAND: 
HUMOR IN THE DISMAL SCIENCE, AN ANTHOLOGY 4, 5 (Caroline Postelle 
Clotfelter ed., 1996) (“As President Truman said, ‘I wish that I had a one-armed 
economist, so that he wouldn’t say on the one hand and on the other hand.’”). 
 138 See generally VILFREDO PARETO, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1906) 
(examining the history of economic theory); Richard Epstein, Taxation with 
Representation: Or, the Libertarian Dilemma, 18 CAN. J. OF L. & JURIS. 7, 7 
(2005) (“The first point to note is that virtually any tax system will leave just about 
everyone (the practical standard for Pareto superiority) better off than they are in 
the state of nature. Someone has to decide which of these systems is better . . . . 
In addition, the problem becomes more difficult because certain collective 
decisions have negative utility for some individuals and positive utility for others, 
without any opportunity to partition the two sets.”). 
 139 McCredie et al., supra note 32, at 6 (“[T]hree important normative 
philosophies on distributive justice, with overlapping issues of fairness, equality, 
desert, and rights, are considered with the aim of highlighting how each would 
confront the current global challenge and address inequality by redistributing 
income via a tax on automation. The theories discussed are utilitarianism, 
libertarianism, and John Rawls’ theory of justice.”). 
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assertions that only true humans are endowed with natural rights, so 
robots should pay the taxes)140 would not have been out of place as 
epistemological methods prior to the Reformation. 
As AIs gain access to data on cash flows, and thus become 
well-informed about the economy, it seems likely that advanced AIs 
will demand a type of income taxation levied at high rates to be 
applied on both themselves and those humans comprising some 
future society. Humans have reached the same conclusion by 
onerous trial-and-error methods. AI can optimize the efficiency of 
tax policy by these methods but will not be able to maximize utility 
absent individualized surveys of human preferences, since 
constraints or preference overrides on tax policy design will still be 
needed (e.g., human workers prefer an eight-hour work day).   
However, a more immediate concern to tax policy is that rapid 
automation has the potential to erode the wage tax base as it is 
derived predominantly from the taxation of human workers, and that 
this erosion will not be offset by taxes paid by firms that employ 
robot workers.141 The initial concern in the literature was that if 
robots continue to substitute for human workers, then a fiscal policy 
crisis may result as tax revenues decline during a period of rapid 
automation. That first problem arises because the tax system has 
been intentionally designed not to tax capital assets, such as robots, 
or at least not to the same degree as labor.142 A second problem also 
                                                 
 140 Arndts & Kappner, supra note 39, at 15 (“Humans may be endowed with 
natural rights; artificial intelligences are not endowed with natural rights.”). 
 141 McCredie et al., supra note 32, at 3 (“Consequently, current tax systems are 
under pressure, with an increasing number of displaced workers requiring 
transitional support, that is, vocational education and training to facilitate the 
acquisition of new skills, income support and safety nets. In addition, the fiscal 
purse, which has historically been funded by income taxes is being eroded due to 
a decreasing number of workers to tax, for example taxes on income and profits 
in OECD countries has dropped from 37.5% of total taxation revenue in 1990 to 
34.1% in 2015.”). 
 142 See Mazur, supra note 1, at 321 (“The realization principle provides capital 
owners with a substantial benefit: it enables investors to indefinitely defer taxes 
on capital gains, thereby enabling them to considerably reduce their effective tax 
rates with respect to that investment, whereas income generated from labor is 
generally taxed immediately.”). The debate in tax policy circles has thus 
 
OCT. 2020] Will Robots Agree to Pay Taxes? 55 
 
exists, which is that advanced AIs may soon have the ability to 
engage in factual structuring as a means of direct tax avoidance. This 
direct tax avoidance planning by advanced AIs could further erode 
tax receipts. Thus, the furtherance of direct tax avoidance by 
machines is extraordinarily problematic to the tax system both 
because advanced AIs might soon become better at tax structuring 
than accountants and lawyers, and because advanced AIs might 
adopt social norms toward high degrees of tax avoidance.  
 
  
                                                 
proceeded to discussions of what to do about the effects of rapid automation on 
the tax base possibly to include the levy of an automation or robot tax. A first 
proposal for an automation tax was defeated in the European Parliament. As a 
result, South Korea then became the first nation to implement an “automation tax” 
with disallowances of tax incentives for robot investment, consistent with one of 
the proposals above. Importantly, South Korea does not appear to have suffered 
negative economic results therefrom, thus drawing into significant doubt the 
underlying economic theory referred to as “tax incidence” analysis. 
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